G.R. No. 48960 ; June 29, 1943
LEONCIA REYES, in her own representation and as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Dalmacio Celino, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ENRIQUE BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Leoncia Reyes, seeks to prohibit the Court of Appeals from taking cognizance of an appeal filed by respondent Enrique Bautista. In the underlying case, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered judgment in favor of Reyes on September 19, 1942. Bautista received notice of this decision on October 10, 1942. He filed a pro forma motion for new trial on October 17, which was denied by the court on the same day, with notice of denial received by Bautista on October 22. Bautista then filed a notice of appeal on October 23, the record on appeal on November 2, and the appeal bond on November 10, 1942. Reyes moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal bond was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period from notice of the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, erroneously holding that the pro forma motion for new trial suspended the appeal period. The Court of Appeals also denied Reyes’s motion to dismiss, concluding that “the ends of justice would be better subserved” by allowing the appeal since the bond was filed only one day late, noting Bautista’s “honest opinion, although erroneously” that his motion interrupted the period.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the appeal, given that the appeal bond was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, and whether a court has discretion to allow an appeal filed out of time based on a mistake of law or a minimal delay.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for prohibition, ordering the dismissal of the appeal.
1. A pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the period for perfecting an appeal under the new Rules of Court. Citing Valdez vs. Jugo, the Court held that such a motion, which fails to specify the findings or conclusions not supported by evidence as required by Rule 37, is treated as a motion pro forma intended to delay and does not interrupt the appeal period. The old practice under the Code of Civil Procedure was expressly abolished.
2. The filing of an appeal bond within the 30-day period is an indispensable prerequisite to perfect an appeal. Rule 41, Section 3 requires the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal to be filed within 30 days from notice of judgment. Rule 52, Section 1(a) allows dismissal for failure to file the bond on time.
3. A court has no discretion to allow an appeal filed out of time in the absence of legal justification. While Bustamante vs. Tirona suggested discretion “in the interest of justice,” this is only operative when the delay is justified by circumstances recognized by law, such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence (Rule 38, Section 2). The Court clarified that without such lawful justification, there is no discretion to admit an untimely appeal.
4. Neither a mistake of law nor a one-day delay constitutes legal justification. The appellant’s mistaken belief that his pro forma motion suspended the period is a mistake of law, which is not excusable. The Court emphatically rejected the argument that a minimal delay serves the “ends of justice,” stating that: (a) it would undermine the orderly administration of justice by rendering appeal periods uncertain; (b) the appealed decision is presumed correct, so denying the appeal does not imply injustice; and (c) the right to appeal is statutory and requires strict compliance.
CONCLUSION: The trial court’s decision became final after the 30-day period lapsed without the timely filing of the appeal bond. Consequently, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal. The petition for prohibition was granted.