G.R. No. 48740 ; August 5, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS and LUISA CORPUZ Y QUITONG, defendants. FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS, appellant.

FACTS

The defendants, Faustino Tolentino y de Dios and Luisa Corpuz y Quitong, pleaded guilty in both the municipal court and the Court of First Instance of Manila to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14. Both being recidivists, they were sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay civil indemnity. Appellant Faustino Tolentino was further sentenced to an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency. He alone appealed, contesting only the correctness of this additional penalty. The information alleged he was a habitual delinquent based on four previous final convictions for theft and estafa, with details provided in a table showing dates of commission, sentence, and release for each. The trial court, treating the present offense as his fourth conviction, sentenced him under Article 62, paragraph 5(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General recommended affirmance, arguing the fourth previous conviction should be disregarded because its date of release was not shown. Appellant’s counsel, accepting the trial court’s finding that this was the fourth conviction, contended it should be treated as only a third conviction for habitual delinquency purposes, arguing the first conviction should be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance of recidivism and not counted towards habitual delinquency.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly imposed the additional penalty for habitual delinquency upon appellant Faustino Tolentino, and specifically, how his previous convictions should be counted and what effect, if any, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has on imposing the principal and additional penalties.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the sentence. It held that the present offense was appellant’s fifth conviction, not his fourth. The Court rejected the Solicitor General’s theory that the fourth previous conviction should be disregarded due to the missing specific date of release. It reasoned that since the fourth sentence was imposed on September 30, 1935, and the current crime was committed on August 13, 1941, the release from that fourth sentence must have occurred within the ten-year period prescribed by the Habitual Delinquency Law. The Court also rejected appellant’s contention that the first conviction should only be an aggravating circumstance and not counted for habitual delinquency. It reaffirmed that a habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist. Therefore, in imposing the principal penalty for the last crime, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism must be taken into account under Articles 14(9) and 64 of the Revised Penal Code. However, for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, recidivism is not considered a separate aggravating circumstance as it is inherent in the concept of habitual delinquency. Since this was appellant’s fifth conviction, he should be sentenced under Article 62, paragraph 5(c) to an additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty, this additional penalty was imposed in its minimum degree. The Court modified the sentence to impose an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor. The rest of the sentence was affirmed.
Separate Opinion (Dissent):
Justice Bocobo dissented. He argued that for a fifth conviction, none of the prior convictions should be deemed an aggravating circumstance of recidivism for fixing the principal penalty, as the previous convictions are already counted in imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. He contended that to consider recidivism separately would be to use the same offense twice against the accused, contrary to the rule of liberal construction of penal laws in favor of the accused. He viewed the essence of recidivism as being absorbed into the total convictions constituting habitual delinquency. Therefore, the principal penalty should be arresto mayor in its minimum degree (one month and one day) due to the plea of guilty, without the aggravation of recidivism.