GR 48577; (September, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-48577 September 30, 1980
Sulpicio A. Garcia, petitioner, vs. Colonel Paul C. Mathis, in his capacity as Base Commander, Clark Air Force Base (CAFB) or his Successor, and the Honorable Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch IV, Dagupan City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Sulpicio A. Garcia filed a complaint on November 8, 1977, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against Colonel Paul C. Mathis as Base Commander of Clark Air Force Base, acting for and on behalf of the United States of America. Garcia alleged he was a civilian employee at the base from May 26, 1949, until his dismissal on August 23, 1956, for alleged bribery and collusion. His prayer included reinstatement, payment of back wages, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Respondent Mathis entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss based solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, arguing he was being sued as a representative of a foreign sovereign which had not consented to the suit. The respondent judge, however, issued an order dated June 7, 1978, dismissing the complaint without addressing the jurisdictional issue. Instead, the court sua sponte held that the cause of action had prescribed, as the complaint itself alleged termination of services on August 23, 1956, and the suit was filed only on November 8, 1977—over 21 years later.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription, which was not raised by the defendant in his pleadings.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. While prescription is generally a defense that must be expressly invoked, an exception exists when the plaintiff’s own allegations in the complaint show clearly that the action has prescribed. Citing Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, the Court held that Garcia’s complaint unequivocally demonstrated prescription, as it revealed a lapse of over 21 years between his dismissal in 1956 and the filing of the suit in 1977. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on this ground.
The Court further noted that the defendant, having entered a special appearance confined to challenging jurisdiction, was constrained from raising other non-jurisdictional grounds like prescription. To do so might have been deemed a voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, as established in Republic vs. Ker & Co., Ltd. Prescinding from the apparently meritorious jurisdictional defense based on state immunity, the dismissal on prescription was correct. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
