G.R. No. 48344 & G.R. No. 48345; November 9, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGRIPINO ALVAREZ, defendant-appellant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HIGINO S. PEREZ, ET AL., defendants-appellee. GAUDIOSO LAPORE, complainant-appellant.

FACTS

Two separate complaints were filed in the justice of the peace court of Cauayan, Negros Occidental, by appellant Gaudioso Lapore in his capacity as chief of police. The first was against Agripino Alvarez for violating a municipal ordinance penalizing the carrying of firearms in political meetings. The second was against Higino S. Perez and eight others for violating a municipal ordinance penalizing the holding of public meetings for election purposes without a prior permit. The justice of the peace court rendered judgments condemning each defendant to a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Appeals from these judgments were interposed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. In the Court of First Instance, the provincial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the cases against the defendants before trial, and the motion was granted. The chief of police (Gaudioso Lapore) now interposes the present appeal from this order of dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the chief of police has the legal authority to appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance dismissing criminal cases, which were originally filed by him for violations of municipal ordinances, after the provincial fiscal moved for their dismissal.

RULING

No. The chief of police has no legal authority to appeal the dismissal. While a chief of police is authorized to file criminal complaints for violations of municipal ordinances constituting public offenses, his control of the case ceases upon the actual intervention of the provincial fiscal or upon the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance. From that point, the provincial fiscal assumes full control and takes charge of the prosecution. Furthermore, a chief of police is not an “injured person” permitted by law to intervene in appropriate cases, as he suffers no personal damage from the commission of the offense. Additionally, citing People vs. Daylo (54 Phil., 862), the dismissal by a Court of First Instance of a criminal case appealed from a justice of the peace court (which had jurisdiction to try and decide it) is equivalent to an acquittal of the defendant. Therefore, an appeal from the order of dismissal would constitute double jeopardy. The order of dismissal is affirmed.