G.R. No. L-48129 February 27, 1989
TERESITA M. ESQUIVEL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JOAQUIN O. ILUSTRE as Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, DR. CARLOS R. BAYLON and EULALIA BAYLON, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Dr. Carlos Baylon filed a petition for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens annotated on a certificate of title. The hearing was set for December 29, 1977. Due to time constraints, petitioner Teresita Esquivel, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file a formal opposition and to reset the hearing. The court did not act on this motion. Petitioner subsequently filed her formal opposition within the extension period she had requested. The court later issued a notice for a hearing on February 1, 1978 to consider the petition and the opposition.
When counsel appeared at the February 1 hearing, he was informed that an order dated December 29, 1977 had already been issued granting the cancellation of the lis pendens. The judge suggested filing a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner complied, but her motion and a subsequent request for a restraining order were denied by the respondent Judge in an order dated March 8, 1978. Records revealed that the lis pendens had been cancelled at the initiative of the private respondents as early as January 3, 1978, prior to the finality of the December 29 order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of due process in issuing the orders dated December 29, 1977 and March 8, 1978.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged orders. The Court found a denial of due process and grave abuse of discretion. While the petitioner was incorrect in presuming her motion for extension was granted due to the court’s inaction, the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by issuing the December 29 order cancelling the lis pendens immediately after receiving the motion for extension, which clearly signaled petitioner’s intent to oppose. The court should have afforded her the opportunity to be heard, especially as her formal opposition was filed within the period sought in her motion and there was no apparent intent to delay.
The Court emphasized that the three-day notice rule for motions is not absolute; procedural technicalities should yield to the paramount interest of allowing parties to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. The subsequent notice for a February 1 hearing indicated the court itself acknowledged the need for a hearing, making the ex parte December 29 order improper. Furthermore, the private respondents’ premature cancellation of the lis pendens on January 3 was a clear violation of established legal principles, as the property remained in litigation. A buyer of property in litigation assumes the attendant risks, and the sale here was made without court approval or the knowledge of the other party in the pending case.