GR 48110; (September, 1942) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48110 ; September 16, 1942
ANIANO BIRON, petitioner, vs. SULPICIO V. CEA, Justice of the Peace of Tabaco, Albay, and EDUARDO BIRON, respondents.
FACTS
On December 27, 1940, petitioner Aniano Biron filed a complaint for grave threats against Eduardo Biron with the respondent Justice of the Peace of Tabaco, Albay. After the preliminary examination of the complainant, the respondent justice issued a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. Following the arrest, the defendant was informed of the charge and the evidence against him and was allowed to present his own evidence. After concluding this preliminary investigation, the respondent justice formed the opinion that the crime committed was merely light threats. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the arrest warrant, declined to transmit the case to the Court of First Instance, and stated that the complainant could file a new charge for light threats. The petitioner then initiated this mandamus proceeding to compel the respondent justice to transmit the warrant of arrest, an abstract of witness testimony, the defendant’s bail, or his person if not on bail, and all other case papers to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
ISSUE
1. Whether a justice of the peace, after a preliminary investigation under the Rules of Court, has the power to discharge the defendant if he finds the evidence does not show probable guilt of the offense charged.
2. In what instances is a justice of the peace, after a preliminary investigation, bound to transmit the abstract of testimony and other papers to the clerk of the Court of First Instance.
RULING
1. Yes, a justice of the peace has the power to discharge the defendant after a preliminary investigation. The Court explained that a preliminary investigation under Rule 108 has two stages: the first, to determine if there is ground for issuing a warrant of arrest, and the second, to determine whether the accused should be released or held for trial. The purpose of the second stage is to decide if the accused should be held for trial. Although Section 13 of Rule 108 does not expressly authorize the justice of the peace to order a release, this power is inherent and incidental to the authority to conduct the investigation. To deny this power would render the defendant’s right to present evidence meaningless and defeat the purpose of the preliminary investigation, which is to protect the innocent from hasty prosecution and the state from useless trials. Therefore, the respondent justice had the authority to order the release of the defendant and cancel the warrant if he found the evidence insufficient.
2. A justice of the peace is bound to transmit the record of the preliminary investigation to the clerk of the Court of First Instance in all instances, whether the defendant is released or held for trial. Section 13 of Rule 108 requires transmission “upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.” This duty applies regardless of the outcome. The purpose is to provide the fiscal with a basis for further action, such as filing an information or, if the accused was discharged, seeking re-arrest upon a new complaint if the fiscal believes the justice’s order was erroneous. However, if the defendant has been released, there is no need to transmit his person or bail.
The Court further noted that the proper remedy for a justice of the peace’s refusal to transmit the record is not a special civil action for mandamus but a mere motion in the Court of First Instance, which has administrative supervision over justices of the peace. Nonetheless, the writ was not denied in this case as it was the first notice of such an administrative remedy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The respondent justice of the peace was ordered to transmit without delay to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Albay the record and other papers of the preliminary investigation conducted against Eduardo Biron. No costs were awarded.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Paras concurred that a justice of the peace has authority to discharge a defendant but dissented on the duty to transmit the record after discharge. He argued that a correct interpretation of Section 13, Rule 108, requires transmission only when the defendant is held to answer, noting the omission in the Philippine Rules of the express requirement found in the American model from which it was copied.