G.R. No. 48071 ; September 3, 1941
HAMMON H. BUCK, petitioner, vs. M. L. DE LA ROSA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Hammon H. Buck is the registered owner of parcels of land in Batangas covered by original certificates of title. Between December 7, 1938, and February 10, 1939, the respondents (except Judge De la Rosa) filed petitions for review of the decrees issued in Buck’s favor for these lands in Land Registration Cases Nos. 803 and 939. A notice of lis pendens was recorded at the respondents’ instance. Buck alleged these petitions for review were malicious and false and that the lis pendens deprived him of the right to dispose of his properties. Consequently, on or about April 4, 1939, he filed a complaint for damages against the respondents (civil case No. 3553). After demurrers were overruled and answers filed, the respondent judge, on November 19, 1940, cited the parties to argue why the action should not be dismissed as premature. Following oral and written arguments, the judge issued an order on December 19, 1940, dismissing the case without costs, on the ground that the action was premature since the petitions for review upon which the damages claim depended were still pending. Buck then instituted this certiorari proceeding to annul the dismissal order.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the order of the respondent judge dismissing the civil action for damages as premature.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. The Court held that certiorari did not lie for the following reasons:
1. The respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the action for damages. The action was based on the alleged malicious and false nature of the petitions for review, and those petitions were still pending trial.
2. The order of dismissal was appealable. Although an appeal is less speedy than certiorari, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be used to supplant the remedy of appeal.
3. The suggestion that the judge should have held the damages action in abeyance pending the review proceedings was an implied admission that the action was prematurely commenced. While the judge had discretion to hold the case in abeyance, his refusal to do so did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion warranting certiorari, especially considering that the new Rules of Court disfavor clogging dockets with dormant cases. The plaintiff was at fault for filing the damages action too early.