GR 47892; (June, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. 47892 , June 10, 1941
PABLO VALENZUELA, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VALERIO FLORES and SEGUNDA SANTIAGO, defendants and appellants.
FACTS
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court by resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 30, 1940, as it involved only questions of law. The appellants contested the legality of two orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur: the order dated May 6, 1939, which dismissed the case on the ground that the appeal from the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, had not been perfected; and the order dated August 2, 1939, which denied the appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the orders of May 6 and June 14, 1939. The June 14 order had itself denied an earlier motion for reconsideration filed by the appellants on May 10, 1939. The appellants argued that the May 6 order was void because they were not notified of the hearing on the appellee’s motion to dismiss. They also argued that the court erred in not reconsidering the orders, claiming that being granted 15 days to submit a memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration was equivalent to the reconsideration itself.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of First Instance acted legally in issuing the order of dismissal dated May 6, 1939, despite the appellants’ claim of lack of notice for the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
2. Whether the Court of First Instance committed an error in denying the motion for reconsideration of its orders.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Court of First Instance.
1. On the first issue, the Court held that the appellants’ allegation of lack of notice was without merit. First, the order of May 6, 1939, was based on the court’s lack of jurisdiction due to the unperfected appeal from the justice of the peace court, a point the appellants did not raise in their argument. In cases involving questions of jurisdiction, the court may, motu proprio and without motion from any party, dismiss the case; if it does not, it can be compelled to do so by a writ of mandamus (Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil. 89; Requepo vs. Judge of First Instance and Rosales, 21 Phil. 79). Second, a copy of the motion to dismiss had been served upon the appellants with notification of the day and hour it was to be submitted to the court. The fact that it was not heard on the designated day due to the judge’s absence did not necessitate a new notification, especially since, as was the practice in that court, a notice was posted on a designated part of its bench informing interested parties and their lawyers that motions not acted upon on the scheduled day would be called on the first day of the next session (Abolencia vs. Maañao, 5 Phil. 79).
2. On the second issue, the Court found the appellants’ theory utterly groundless. Requiring the submission of a memorandum in support of a motion does not imply the court’s acceptance of its contents. Therefore, the court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration.
Costs were assessed against the appellants.