GR 47726; (June, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. 47726 ; June 20, 1941
MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICTORINO DANGOY, defendant and appellant.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila, is the owner of a parcel of land in Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal, occupied by the defendant, Victorino Dangoy, as a tenant. Due to non-payment of rentals, the plaintiff filed an ejectment suit. On December 17, 1935, the justice of the peace court rendered a decision (Exhibit A) ordering the defendant to pay the unpaid rentals and to restore possession of the land to the plaintiff. A writ of execution (Exhibit B) was issued on August 1 and 5, 1936. The provincial sheriff delegate, Baldomero Santos, notified the defendants and gave them a one-week period to remove their houses from the land. The defendants refused to vacate. Consequently, on October 25, 1937, the plaintiff filed a motion (Exhibit C) with the justice of the peace court, seeking an order authorizing the provincial sheriff to remove the defendants’ houses or other improvements from the land, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 89 . After a hearing where the plaintiff presented evidence, the justice of the peace, Marcelo J. Ramos, denied the motion by order of August 10, 1938 (Exhibit D), falsely alleging the plaintiff presented no evidence. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Exhibit F) was also denied by order of September 1, 1938 (Exhibit E). The plaintiff then appealed the order of August 10, 1938, to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Upon the appeal being elevated, the clerk of court sent a notice to the defendant’s lawyer, Juan Rustia, on October 14, 1938, to file a demurrer or answer. The notice was received on October 17, 1938. The defendant and his lawyer failed to file a demurrer or answer within the period. On December 7, 1938, the plaintiff moved to have the defendant declared in default, which the court granted by order of December 10, 1938. After receiving the plaintiff’s evidence, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on December 20, 1938, authorizing the provincial sheriff to remove the defendants’ houses or other improvements and to deliver possession of the land to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed this decision.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in declaring the defendant in default, considering there was no complaint or reproduced pleading before it, nor a new one filed.
2. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in giving due course to an appeal from a non-appealable order and in rendering judgment without jurisdiction.
3. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in denying the defendant’s motions for reconsideration.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
1. On the first alleged error, the Court held that the defendant’s interpretation of the law was erroneous. The order of the justice of the peace denying the plaintiff’s motion for a writ of demolition was a final and definitive order. An appeal lies not only from a judgment but also from final and definitive orders. Since the defendant was duly notified of the plaintiff’s motion in the justice of the peace court and of the appeal in the Court of First Instance, his failure to appear and file a demurrer or answer in the Court of First Instance properly resulted in his being declared in default. The Court emphasized that procedural laws should be liberally interpreted to achieve their ends and to better protect the rights and interests of the parties. To rule otherwise would deny the plaintiff, who had been declared entitled to possession, the protection afforded by Article 446 of the Civil Code, which states that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession and, if disturbed, shall be protected or restored therein by the means established by the laws of procedure.
2. & 3. The second and third alleged errors being corollaries of the first, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss them separately, as the resolution of the first error was dispositive.
The appealed decision was confirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant.