G.R. No. 47616 & G.R. No. 47623 ; September 16, 1947
Case Parties/Title:

G.R. No. 47616 : JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.
G.R. No. 47623 : LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

1. On October 15, 1941, the Supreme Court promulgated two decisions:
In G.R. No. 47616 (Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor*), the Court affirmed a lower court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Jose Tan Chong, holding that he, being born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was a Philippine citizen.
In G.R. No. 47623 (Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth*), the Court dismissed Lam Swee Sang’s petition for naturalization, holding that he, having been born in Sulu, Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was already a Philippine citizen, making naturalization unnecessary.
2. On October 21, 1941, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration in both cases, contending that such individuals were not Philippine citizens under the laws in force at their birth. The motion was pending when World War II broke out, and the records were destroyed. The records were later reconstituted in 1946.

ISSUE

Whether a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother (lawfully married) is a citizen of the Philippines under the laws in force at the time of their birth.

RULING

The Supreme Court, upon reconsideration, REVERSED its 1941 decisions and held that neither Jose Tan Chong nor Lam Swee Sang was a Philippine citizen at birth.
1. Abandonment of Jus Soli: The Court definitively abandoned the principle of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth) as a rule in Philippine jurisdiction. It overruled prior cases (like Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs) that had applied this principle and expressly overruled the 1941 decisions in these very cases.
2. Applicable Law – Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: The citizenship status of the petitioners/applicant was governed by Section 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), as amended by the Act of March 23, 1912. This provision did not extend the principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the Philippines.
3. Citizenship under the Philippine Bill: Section 4 declared that only a specific class of inhabitants were citizens of the Philippine Islands: those who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, who continued to reside therein, and their children born subsequent thereto.
4. Application to the Cases:
* Jose Tan Chong (born 1915): His father was a Chinese subject, not a Spanish subject, on April 11, 1899. Therefore, his father did not belong to the class of inhabitants who became Philippine citizens under Section 4. Consequently, Tan Chong, born of an alien (Chinese) father, did not acquire Philippine citizenship at birth.
* Lam Swee Sang (born 1900): At the time of his birth, there was no law on Philippine citizenship, as the Philippine Bill was enacted only in 1902. His father was a Chinese subject, and his mother, upon marriage, acquired her husband’s Chinese nationality. Thus, when the Philippine Bill took effect, neither Lam Swee Sang nor his parents were Spanish subjects and could not have acquired citizenship under Section 4. His first opportunity to become a citizen was through naturalization under the laws enacted pursuant to the Jones Law of 1916.
5. Conclusion: The petitioners/applicant, being born of an alien father who was not a Spanish subject on the crucial date, did not fall within the class of citizens defined by the governing law (the Philippine Bill). Therefore, they were not Philippine citizens at birth. The writ of habeas corpus in G.R. No. 47616 should not have been granted, and the petition for naturalization in G.R. No. 47623 was properly dismissible on the ground that the applicant was an alien, not a citizen.