G.R. No. 47446 ; June 30, 1941
JOSE P. BANTUG, petitioner, vs. MAMERTO ROXAS, as Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOAQUIN GARCIA, as sheriff of the City of Manila, and AURELIO MONTINOLA, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Jose P. Bantug, was and is the tenant of a small parcel of land (367.7 sq. m.) owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, paying a monthly rent of P7.50. He had built a house on the land, which was his residence since 1919. The property, part of the Hacienda Vitocruz, was transferred to the respondent Aurelio Montinola, who notified Bantug several times to vacate the land and remove his house unless he agreed to pay a monthly rent of P37.67. Bantug did not agree and instead proposed that Montinola buy the house, and he continued occupying the land. Montinola then filed an action against Bantug in the Municipal Court, which rendered judgment against Bantug, ordering him to vacate the land, remove his house, and pay Montinola a monthly rent of P15 from June 29, 1938, plus costs. Bantug appealed this judgment to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which affirmed it. While the appeal was pending, Bantug paid the fixed rent of P15 per month during the first ten days of each month. However, due to his son’s illness and his complete dedication to the child’s care, he failed to pay the rent for December 1939 on or before January 10, 1940. This prompted Montinola to file a motion for execution of the Municipal Court’s judgment. The Court of First Instance granted the motion by order dated January 31, 1940, and ordered the execution of said judgment. Upon learning of Montinola’s motion filed on January 17, 1940, Bantug deposited the sum of P15 (representing the December 1939 rent) a few days later and opposed the motion for execution. To prevent the execution of the January 31, 1940 order, Bantug initiated certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision promulgated on April 10, 1940, dismissed the petition and lifted the preliminary writ of prohibition it had issued. Against this decision, the present appeal was interposed via another petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the prevailing plaintiff and upon proof that the defendant deposited the rent a few days after the 10th of the month it was due, must necessarily order the execution of the judgment rendered by the Municipal Court, pursuant to Article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 4115 .

RULING

No. The Court of First Instance has the power, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to deny a motion for execution of the inferior court’s judgment under equitable circumstances to prevent irreparable injury, even if the defendant failed to pay the rent within the first ten days of the month as required by Article 88.
The provision in Article 88, as amended, requiring the defendant against whom a judgment for ejectment and payment of rent has been rendered to deposit or pay, while the appeal is pending, the rent fixed during the first ten days of the month following the one in which the rent fell due, is mandatory, and the Court of First Instance hearing the appeal cannot evade it. However, the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to suspend the execution of the justice of the peace court’s judgment to give the defendant an opportunity to post the bond that suspends the execution of said judgment.
In this case, the reason for denying the execution of the Municipal Court’s judgment was patent and compelling. The petitioner’s omission and neglect were due to his son’s illness. Furthermore, if the judgment were executed, the petitioner would be deprived forever of his home, where he and his family have resided since 1919, and for the construction of which he may have used all his savings. For these reasons, the Court should have denied the motion for execution. In granting it, the court acted with an inexorable rigidity that this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, can temper in the interest of equity and to avoid irreparable injury to the petitioner.
Moreover, Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that when, through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party, said party may file a petition in the same Court to set aside such judgment, order, or proceeding. Under this provision, a party may be relieved from the effects of an omission to pay rent within the first ten days of each month if it is proven that such omission was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Considering the special circumstances present here, it can be said that this is a case of excusable negligence.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated January 31, 1940, are reversed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.