GR 47411; (February, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-47411. February 20, 1981.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUFEMIO CAPARAS Y PAEZ and PATRICIO DIAMSAY Y GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
The case originated from a land dispute between first cousins. Accused Eufemio Caparas, his sister, and his uncle Pedro Paez jointly purchased agricultural land in 1967, with the titles consolidated under Caparas’s name for convenience. From 1967 to 1970, Pedro Paez and his sons, including the victim Simeon Paez, cultivated their ten-hectare share. A conflict arose in 1970 when Caparas proposed selling the land to the government at a price the Paezes believed was prejudicial, leading to heated arguments. Caparas subsequently replaced Pedro Paez as overseer with co-accused Patricio Diamsay.
On January 27, 1971, Lydia Posadas, daughter-in-law of Pedro Paez, overheard Caparas plotting to have Simeon killed. The Paez family, warned, moved to their town residence. On February 5, 1971, Simeon, who had returned to the sitio to check on his sick child, was approached by Patricio Diamsay. Diamsay, armed with a shotgun belonging to Caparas, declared his intent to kill Simeon and then shot him, causing fatal wounds. Diamsay also fired at Simeon’s brother Pablo but missed.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the evidence sufficiently establishes conspiracy between Caparas and Diamsay to hold both liable for the murder of Simeon Paez.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding conspiracy duly proven. The legal logic rests on the principle that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence but can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime, indicating a common purpose.
The Court found credible the testimony of Lydia Posadas regarding Caparas’s plot, corroborated by witness Laureano Salvador, who had no motive to testify falsely and whose account was against his own interest, thereby enhancing its weight. The act of Diamsay, Caparas’s overseer, in using Caparas’s shotgun to execute the killing pursuant to the overheard plan, demonstrates their concerted action. The rejection of Caparas’s defense—which relied on the negative testimony of his wife, Priscilla, who claimed Lydia was not at the haystack—was proper, as a positive testimony outweighs a negative one. With conspiracy established, Caparas is equally liable as principal for the murder committed by Diamsay. The killing was qualified by evident premeditation, inherent in the proven conspiracy. The penalty for Diamsay was slightly modified per the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering his voluntary surrender.
