G.R. No. 47409 ; June 27, 1941
Angel P. Miguel, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of the deceased Dorotea Ravago de los Santos, petitioner, vs. Arsenio P. Dizon, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Peregrina Tan, respondents.

FACTS

In Land Registration Case No. 921 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the deceased Dorotea Ravago de los Santos was an opponent, and Lot No. 2 was adjudicated in her favor. On October 2, 1939, respondent Peregrina Tan filed a petition in the same registration case, seeking the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 17134 issued in the name of the deceased Dorotea Ravago de los Santos for Lot No. 2 and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her (Tan’s) name. She based her claim on having purchased the lot at a sheriff’s sale on September 1, 1937. The petitioner, as executor, opposed Tan’s petition on October 13, 1939, arguing that since Torrens Title No. 17134 was already issued in the deceased’s name and the alleged sheriff’s sale preceded the issuance of this title, the decree could only be reviewed for fraud under Section 38 of Act No. 496 . On October 20, 1939, the court ordered the cancellation of the certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in favor of Tan. The petitioner received a copy of this order on October 26, 1939, and filed a formal exception on October 27, 1939. On October 30, 1939, the petitioner filed a separate civil case (Civil Case No. 5898) against the Provincial Sheriff and Peregrina Tan, seeking to annul the sheriff’s sale of the lot. On November 2, 1939, the petitioner filed a motion in Registration Case No. 921, attaching a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5898, requesting that the effects of the October 20, 1939 order be suspended until a final judgment was rendered in the civil case. The court denied this motion on December 18, 1939. The petitioner received a copy of this denial on December 27, 1939, announced his intention to appeal the orders of October 20 and December 18, 1939, and filed his bill of exceptions on December 29, 1939. On January 10, 1940, the respondent judge disapproved this bill of exceptions. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 1940.

ISSUE

Whether the bill of exceptions was filed within the period prescribed by law. This depends on the interpretation of the petitioner’s November 2, 1939 motion—specifically, whether it should be considered a motion for new trial, which would suspend the period for perfecting the bill of exceptions.

RULING

Yes, the bill of exceptions was filed on time. The Court held that the November 2, 1939 motion, although not expressly labeled as a motion for new trial, implicitly argued that the October 20, 1939 order was contrary to law and the facts. This was evident because the motion was accompanied by a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5898, which sought the annulment of the very sheriff’s sale upon which Peregrina Tan based her claim. Therefore, the motion should be considered a motion for new trial. Consequently, the period for perfecting the bill of exceptions was suspended and began to run only from the denial of that motion on December 18, 1939. The bill of exceptions filed on December 29, 1939, was thus within the legal period. The petition was granted. The respondent judge was ordered to approve and elevate the bill of exceptions. The Court’s preliminary injunction order dated March 16, 1940, was confirmed pending resolution of Civil Case No. 5898. Costs were adjudged against respondent Peregrina Tan.