G.R. No. L-47315. June 29, 1978.
YREL ALCALA TORRES JESENA, represented by his Guardian-Mother ERLINDA TORRES, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS HERVAS, Judge of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo City, and LETECIA JAVELLANA JESENA, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Yrel Torres Jesena filed an action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child of the deceased Orlando Jesena, Sr. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo City rendered a decision on July 26, 1977, denying his claim. Petitioner received the decision on August 9, 1977, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 18, 1977. The motion alleged in general terms that the decision was contrary to law and evidence, failed to give credence to his witnesses, and requested the court to take his evidence into account. The trial court, after a hearing where petitioner and his counsel were absent, denied the motion as pro forma in an order dated September 22, 1977.
Petitioner received the denial order on September 27, 1977. On September 29, 1977, he filed an urgent motion to appeal as a pauper. He later filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal on October 5, 1977. Private respondents opposed these motions and moved to declare the judgment final and executory, arguing the appeal was filed out of time. After another hearing where petitioner was absent, respondent Judge issued an Order on October 12, 1977, dismissing petitioner’s motions and declaring the judgment final. Petitioner assailed this order via certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion to appeal as a pauper and in declaring the judgment final and executory.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The ruling hinged on the nature of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Under Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment alleged to be unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. Petitioner’s motion merely made general allegations without specifying the errors. Consequently, it was correctly adjudged a pro forma motion.
A pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal. The reglementary 30-day period to perfect an appeal commenced on August 10, 1977 (the day after receipt of the decision) and expired on September 8, 1977. All subsequent motions—the motion to appeal as a pauper filed on September 29 and the notice of appeal filed on October 5—were therefore filed beyond the reglementary period. The trial court’s judgment had thus become final and executory by the time petitioner attempted to appeal. Respondent Judge’s order was a correct application of procedural law and not a capricious exercise of judgment. The temporary restraining order was lifted.