G.R. No. L-46542. July 21, 1978.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HERMENEGILDO A. PRIETO, SR., CFI Branch IV, Roxas Isabela, and DARIO GAMAYON, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from the Court of First Instance of Isabela, where accused Dario Gamayon was charged with a criminal offense. After posting bail, Gamayon repeatedly failed to appear for trial. Consequently, on February 7, 1977, respondent Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr. issued a legally sound order declaring Gamayon’s bail bond forfeited, issuing a warrant for his arrest, and granting his bondsmen thirty days to produce him and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the bond amount. However, upon a motion for reconsideration, the judge set aside this order. He reasoned that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which allows a trial to proceed in the absence of an accused after arraignment if duly notified, the forfeiture of the bail bond was premature until after a judgment of conviction is rendered and the accused fails to appear for its promulgation.

ISSUE

Whether the constitutional provision allowing trial in absentia abrogates or renders inapplicable the rules on bail bond forfeiture when an accused fails to appear for trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, finding grave abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that the constitutional innovation allowing trial to continue in the accused’s absence under specific conditions is limited solely to preventing a miscarriage of justice due to trial delays. It does not nullify the accused’s undertaking in the bail bond or the applicable Rules of Court. Bail is security given for the release of a person in custody, conditioned upon his appearance before the court as required. Rule 114, Section 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly mandates the forfeiture of the bond if the defendant fails to appear as required. The constitutional provision does not confer a right to “jump bail” or excuse the accused from his contractual obligation under the bond. Therefore, the respondent Judge’s initial order was correct and should not have been reconsidered. The trial-in-absentia rule and bail forfeiture rules operate independently; the former addresses trial continuity, while the latter enforces the accused’s duty to appear. The Judge’s subsequent order misinterpreted the Constitution and disregarded the clear mandate of the Rules, constituting a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reinstated the February 7, 1977 order.