G.R. No. L-46080 November 10, 1978
DOMINADOR LAYOSA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P. RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and FERNANDO M. DILIG, City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, respondents.

FACTS

Dominador Layosa, the Collector of Customs of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Palawan with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ( Republic Act No. 3019 ). The information, filed on March 17, 1977, alleged that from April to December 1976, he demanded and received two to three cases of beer and soft drinks from the patron of M/V Lady Angelita I in exchange for granting the vessel preferential berthing facilities. The following day, the City Fiscal filed a motion for Layosa’s suspension from office pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 . A hearing on the motion was held on March 25, 1977, during which Layosa’s counsel cross-examined the prosecution’s witness. Respondent Judge Jose P. Rodriguez granted the suspension motion in an order dated April 11, 1977.
Layosa filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the suspension order. He argued that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had been issued and the case had not yet been raffled to a specific branch when the suspension hearing was conducted. He also cited a telegram from the Chief State Prosecutor directing a review of the case record. Due to his defiance of the suspension order, the lower court later found him in contempt. The respondent Judge, in his comment, justified his action by citing the need to avoid delay and Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court, which allows the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to raffle.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of suspension against Layosa despite his claims of lack of jurisdiction over his person and procedural irregularities.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court ruled that jurisdiction over the case was vested in the lower court upon the filing of the valid information for an offense within its jurisdiction. The requirements of due process were satisfied as Layosa was duly notified of the pre-suspension hearing and his counsel actively participated by cross-examining the witness. Public interest demands a speedy resolution of suspension proceedings under R.A. No. 3019 to prevent the accused from using office to influence the proceedings.
On the jurisdictional objection, the Court held that any lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused was waived. Layosa’s voluntary appearance through counsel at the pre-suspension hearing constituted a submission to the court’s authority. Jurisdictional objections over the person must be raised specifically and exclusively; by participating in the hearing on the merits of the suspension, Layosa effectively waived such objection. The procedural context, including the eventual raffle of the case to respondent Judge’s sala and Layosa’s subsequent posting of bail and arraignment, further confirmed the regularity of the proceedings. The suspension order was therefore validly issued.