G.R. No. L-45581 December 29, 1978
ROSE INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rose Industries, Inc. filed a collection suit against Nemesis Azcueta, Sr. and respondent Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc. as surety. The Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Rose Industries on December 29, 1975. Respondent Sentinel received a copy on February 5, 1976, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 3, which was denied on April 12. Sentinel received the denial order on May 6, 1976. On May 7, Sentinel filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file the record on appeal until May 30, which the trial court granted.
No record on appeal was filed by May 30. Instead, on June 1, Sentinel filed a second motion for extension. The trial court granted an additional five days, making the final deadline June 4, 1976. However, Sentinel filed its record on appeal only on June 7, 1976. Petitioner Rose Industries opposed its approval for being late. Sentinel cited typhoon “Didang” as cause for the delay. The trial court dismissed the appeal for failure to file on time. Sentinel filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, which initially dismissed it but later, via a resolution dated February 1, 1977, set aside its own decision and ordered the trial court to give due course to the appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to respondent Sentinel’s appeal, which was perfected out of time.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the Court of Appeals’ initial decision dismissing Sentinel’s appeal. The reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. While jurisprudence recognizes a court’s discretion to extend the period in the interest of justice, such discretion is not unconditional and requires a legal justification. The liberal interpretation applies only when, for instance, the remaining period is very short, the record is voluminous, or there is another justifiable reason, provided the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the period.
Here, no legal justification existed. The first extension expired on May 30, 1976. The second motion for extension was filed only on June 1, which was already beyond the deadline. Therefore, the trial court had no authority to grant the second extension, and the record on appeal filed on June 7 was indisputably late. Furthermore, the appeal lacked merit. The surety bond executed by Sentinel clearly established its solidary liability for the principal obligation, which was not disputed. Allowing an appeal that is both procedurally infirm and substantively without merit would only delay the administration of justice. Consequently, the trial court’s decision was declared final and executory.