GR 45487; (October, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45487 October 30, 1981
ANTONIO A. NEPOMUCENO, et al., petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, military officers, were arrested and detained following the declaration of martial law. They filed a petition for habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition, challenging their detention and seeking to enjoin their prosecution before a military commission. During the pendency of the petition, the President ordered their temporary release. Consequently, this Court, in a Resolution dated August 10, 1978, dismissed the habeas corpus aspect as moot and academic, citing Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that while their detention had ceased, the petition for prohibition remained viable. They contended that the government had forfeited its right to prosecute them due to an alleged gross violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial, as they remained charged before Military Commission No. 5 and faced the prospect of future trial and imprisonment.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners’ right to a speedy trial was violated, thereby warranting the dismissal of the charges against them and rendering the prohibition aspect of their petition justiciable despite their release.
RULING
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The legal logic is anchored on the following points. First, the claim that the government forfeited its right to prosecute suggests prescription, but the crimes charged had not prescribed. Second, the right to a speedy trial is relative and must be based on a delay that is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. Here, petitioners had not even been arraigned because they themselves challenged the military commission’s validity through a motion to quash and a supplemental petition before this Court. The delay was thus attributable to their own legal maneuvers. Furthermore, the President ordered the suspension of proceedings, and any initial delay in filing charges was justified by the exigencies of martial law and the complex nature of the alleged nationwide conspiracy, measures presumed to be in good faith to quell rebellion. Third, precedents where denial of speedy trial led to dismissal involved situations where, after arraignment, the prosecution repeatedly failed to proceed without valid excuse, giving rise to a presumption of no evidence. No such circumstance existed here. Therefore, no violation of the right to speedy trial was established, and the prohibition aspect did not survive the mootness of the habeas corpus petition. The dismissal of the entire petition stands.
