G.R. No. L-45347 July 13, 1978
LUSTIANO FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. MOISES F. DALISAY, SR., in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch V; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MERCEDITA VILLAPANA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Lustiano Flores was convicted of attempted rape. The decision was promulgated on October 14, 1976. On October 21, 1976, within the 15-day reglementary period, Flores filed a notice of appeal. However, the fiscal moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was filed out of time because one week had elapsed since promulgation and that Flores had allegedly commenced serving his sentence. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
Flores, a detention prisoner without bail, returned to jail after the promulgation. His counsel de oficio who handled the trial was not present during promulgation. The trial court, noting the absence of an immediate notice of appeal and Flores’s return to custody, concluded he intended to serve his sentence and had waived his appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Flores’s appeal on the grounds that it was filed out of time and that he had commenced serving his sentence.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus, directing the trial court to give due course to the appeal. The legal logic is clear: the right to appeal is a statutory right, and its exercise is governed by specific rules. Under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, an appeal in a criminal case must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of judgment. Flores filed his notice on the seventh day, making it indisputably seasonable. The fiscal’s and trial court’s reliance on the mere lapse of one week was a fundamental error, confusing common practice with the explicit legal deadline.
The Court rejected the presumption that Flores’s return to jail as a detention prisoner equated to commencing service of his sentence and waiving his appeal. A detention prisoner without bail has no alternative but to return to custody. Commencement of service requires a positive act by the accused or a court order for execution, not merely a return to a cell where he was already detained. The trial court had a ministerial duty to allow a timely appeal. Its assumption of waiver was unwarranted, especially since the defense counsel was absent at promulgation, and no written waiver was executed by Flores as required by Section 7, Rule 120. The case of People vs. Mamatik was distinguished, as there the accused positively commenced service. Here, mandamus lies to compel the performance of the ministerial duty to give due course to the appeal.