GR 44980; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 44980 February 6, 1990
VIRGINIA MARAHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch VI, Carigara, Leyte; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL y PEREZ, FRUTO BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN and DALISAY BRAZIL Y AYASO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Virginia Marahay filed an action for recovery of real property. After issues were joined, trial commenced with petitioner taking the witness stand. The continuation of her cross-examination was set for February 18, 1976. Prior to this, her counsel, Atty. Monjardin, filed a motion for postponement as he was taking an examination in Manila. The court reset the hearing to February 18, 1976. On said date, petitioner, who was an invalid moving around in a wheelchair, appeared in court but without her counsel. Private respondents orally moved to dismiss the case for alleged failure to prosecute. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration, both denied, prompting this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint due to the absence of petitioner’s counsel despite her personal appearance in court.
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the dismissal orders, and reinstated the case. The legal logic is anchored on the proper application of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which allows dismissal for failure to prosecute. The Court clarified that the rule pertains to the absence of the plaintiff, not the absence of counsel. In this case, the plaintiff was present and manifestly willing to proceed, as evidenced by her personal attendance despite her physical handicap. Her response to the court that her counsel was in Manila was a factual statement from an unschooled litigant, not a manifestation of unwillingness to prosecute.
The test for dismissal on this ground is whether the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence. The record showed no pattern of delay or wanton disregard of rules by the petitioner. The previous postponements were for justifiable reasons, such as the counsel’s examination. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have liberally construed the rules to afford the petitioner, especially considering her disability, a reasonable opportunity to secure other counsel or continue the trial. The precipitate dismissal deprived her of due process and her day in court. The Supreme Court emphasized that the rules of procedure are tools to secure substantial justice, and dismissals on technicalities are frowned upon when they unjustly bar a litigant from presenting evidence on the merits.