GR 44806; (March, 1977) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-44806 March 31, 1977
Bienvenido Once, petitioner, vs. Hon. Carlos Y. Gonzales, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Branch VI; Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, and Juanito Peña, respondents.
FACTS
The City Court of Iloilo City ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment owned by Juanito Peña and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until vacation, plus attorney’s fees. The decision did not specify the commencement date for the rental payments and did not adjudge any back rentals. Once appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). During the appeal, Once made timely deposits of the current monthly rentals with the city court and later with the CFI for the months of April to August 1976.
The private respondent, Peña, filed a motion for immediate execution of the city court’s judgment pending appeal, citing Once’s alleged failure to file a supersedeas bond and the untenantable condition of the apartment. Once opposed, arguing his rental deposits stayed execution and that the condition of the building did not warrant immediate ejectment. The CFI, through Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira, granted the motion for execution solely on the ground that Once had not filed a supersedeas bond. Once’s motions for reconsideration and subsequent offer to file a bond were denied, and a writ of execution was issued, leading to his ejectment.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the city court’s judgment pending appeal on the ground of the tenant’s failure to file a supersedeas bond.
RULING
Yes, the CFI committed a patent error. Execution pending appeal was improper. Under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a supersedeas bond is required to stay execution only when the judgment of the inferior court includes accrued rentals or damages. The city court’s decision in this case did not award any back rentals; it only ordered payment of monthly rentals from an unspecified future date and attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees did not necessitate a supersedeas bond. Consequently, Once’s obligation to stay execution was solely to deposit the current rentals as they fell due during the appeal, which he did faithfully and promptly. His deposits for April to August 1976 legally stayed the execution. The lower court’s reliance on the absence of a supersedeas bond was a clear misapplication of the rule, rendering the execution order void. The Supreme Court set aside the challenged orders. It was noted that the CFI had subsequently reversed the city court’s judgment on appeal.