GR 44759; December, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-44759 December 17, 1976
LAUREANO FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE JAIME M. LANTIN and THE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Laureano Fernandez was charged with Libel under an Information filed by an Assistant City Fiscal. The libelous letter alleged that Iluminada Tandiama, a married woman, was discovered having an “illicit relationship” with Prison Guard Hector Valdeleon, described as her “paramour,” and that she was subsequently transferred to another penal farm. Fernandez filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information was invalid as it was filed by the fiscal and not by the offended party. He invoked Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires a complaint by the offended party for defamation consisting of an imputation of a crime that cannot be prosecuted de oficio (i.e., privately), such as adultery. The respondent Judge denied the motion, ruling that the imputation of an “illicit relationship” could be construed as a vice or defect, not necessarily a specific crime like adultery, thus falling outside the requirement of a private complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the Information for libel should be quashed for failure to comply with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which mandates that a criminal action for defamation imputing a crime not prosecutable de oficio must be initiated upon complaint by the offended party.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition to set aside the Order denying the Motion to Quash but issued a directive to the City Fiscal. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of the libelous imputation. The Court held that the terms “illicit relation” and “paramour,” when referring to a married woman, naturally and commonly imply the crime of adultery. Adultery is a private crime that cannot be prosecuted de oficio; thus, under Article 360, the complaint must be filed by the offended party. The fiscal’s Information alone, without the offended party’s verified complaint, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. However, the error is procedural and correctable. The Court did not order the dismissal of the case. Instead, it directed the City Fiscal to file, within ten days, either the sworn statement of the offended party taken during the preliminary investigation (if it complies with the rules) or her verified complaint. This would satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, allowing the case to proceed. The ruling balances the procedural mandate of Article 360 with the interest of judicial economy, preventing dismissal on a technicality while upholding the substantive rule that prosecutions for libel imputing private crimes require the initiative of the offended party.
