G.R. No. L-44565. April 22, 1977.
PILAR S. VERGEL DE DIOS, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and PROCERFINA M. ELBO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pilar S. Vergel de Dios filed an ejectment case against private respondent Procerfina M. Elbo in the City Court of Manila for failure to pay rentals on time for rooms used as a student dormitory. After nearly a year of delays, primarily due to postponements secured by the respondent, petitioner completed her evidence presentation. Hearings for respondent’s evidence were set multiple times. The March 30, 1976 hearing was crucial; neither respondent nor her new counsel appeared despite notice. Consequently, the City Court rendered a judgment of ejectment on April 22, 1976, based on petitioner’s evidence.
Upon petitioner’s motion, a writ of execution was issued before the appeal period expired, but its implementation was delayed. Respondent then filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 with the Court of First Instance (CFI). The respondent judge granted the petition, setting aside the City Court’s judgment and ordering the case remanded for reception of respondent’s evidence. Petitioner filed the instant certiorari and mandamus petition, challenging the CFI’s orders as grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent’s petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

Yes, the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the CFI’s order, and ordered the execution of the City Court’s final ejectment judgment. The legal logic centers on the proper application of Rule 38 on relief from judgment, which requires that the failure to file an appeal or to appear for trial must be due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The Court found no such excusable neglect in respondent’s failure to appear at the March 30, 1976 hearing. The proceedings had already suffered undue delay for over a year through maneuvers by respondent’s counsel, including repeated postponements, abrupt changes of counsel, and unfulfilled promises to deposit rental arrears. These were transparent tactics to delay the summary ejectment suit and prolong occupation without paying rentals.
The Court emphasized that the summary nature of ejectment proceedings would be rendered meaningless if such dilatory maneuvers were tolerated and then rewarded with relief from judgment. Rule 38 cannot be used as an instrument to perpetuate a lessee’s possession without fulfilling rental obligations. While the CFI’s view on the procedural path after granting relief (remand vs. trial de novo) had plausibility given Republic Act 6031, resolving that point was unnecessary. The decisive factor was the absence of a valid ground for relief. The failure to appear was a deliberate part of a pattern of delay, not an excusable oversight. Thus, granting relief under these circumstances constituted a capricious and whimsical exercise of power, amounting to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.