GR 44291; (August, 1936) (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The Court’s analysis in People v. Santos correctly identifies the non-delegation doctrine as the central issue, but its application is overly rigid and fails to consider the permissible scope of regulatory authority. By declaring the conditional clause of the administrative order “null and void” for “supplying a defect of the law,” the decision adopts a formalistic view that any rule not explicitly mirrored in the statute constitutes unlawful legislation. This reasoning ignores the principle that an agency may fill in the details of a broad statutory scheme, as authorized by Section 4 of Act No. 4003 , which granted the Secretary power to issue rules “necessary and proper” to carry the Act into effect. The Court’s reliance on U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho is apt for the prohibition against creating crimes, but it conflates the substantive creation of a new prohibition—which the clause arguably is—with the permissible specification of conditions under a general legislative policy to regulate fishing near strategic areas.

A more nuanced critique reveals the decision’s failure to properly distinguish between a valid “filling up of details” and an invalid delegation of legislative power. The statute’s silence on regulating unlicensed boats in military zones does not inherently mean the Secretary acted ultra vires; it could be interpreted as a gap the Secretary was empowered to address to effectuate the Act’s overarching purpose of conservation and security. The Court’s holding that the clause “extends” the law presumes the legislature intended no regulation in that area, a conclusion not necessarily compelled by the text. A stronger analytical approach would have examined whether the condition was a logical and necessary corollary to the regulation of licensed boats, serving the same public safety and jurisdictional aims, rather than a wholly new and unrelated policy.

Ultimately, while the outcome on jurisdictional grounds may have been procedurally sound, the Court’s substantive reasoning on delegation sets a problematic precedent that could unduly constrain administrative governance. By invalidating the clause without a more searching inquiry into whether it fell within the “necessary and proper” implementation of the statutory scheme, the decision leans toward a strict scrutiny of administrative rules that is inconsistent with the practical needs of regulatory enforcement. This creates a formalism where agencies are paralyzed unless every specific scenario is enumerated by the legislature, undermining the very efficiency and expertise that delegated rulemaking is meant to provide.