G.R. No. 43886 . July 19, 1989.
IRENE DINO, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO L. VALENCIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XXXI, and FRANCISCO L. ONG, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Irene Dino, the registered owner of a parcel of land, entered into an “Affidavit and Memorandum of Quitclaim” with private respondent Francisco L. Ong, an adverse claimant. Under this agreement, Dino obligated herself to pay Ong P90,000.00 in installments. In exchange, Ong would waive all claims to the land and cancel his adverse claim on the title. A critical provision stated that if Dino defaulted on any single payment, the full remaining balance would become immediately due and demandable, and she would additionally pay P20,000.00 as liquidated damages.
Dino subsequently issued five postdated checks for the balance. These checks were dishonored upon presentment. Consequently, Ong filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages. In her Answer, Dino admitted issuing the checks and their dishonor but claimed the original agreement had been novated by a subsequent oral agreement where Ong allegedly agreed to wait for a lump-sum payment instead of depositing the checks on their due dates. She did not, however, specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the written Quitclaim document.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly rendered a judgment on the pleadings.

RULING

Yes, the trial court correctly rendered a judgment on the pleadings. Under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the complaint. The core of Ong’s complaint was Dino’s breach of the written Quitclaim agreement. By failing to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of that document, Dino is deemed under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court to have admitted it. Her defense of subsequent oral novation, while purporting to alter the payment terms, did not constitute a specific denial under oath of the document’s authenticity. Therefore, her Answer effectively admitted the material allegations of the complaint—the existence of the binding contract and her breach thereof by issuing dishonored checks.
The Court also rejected Dino’s procedural objections. A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on an answer that admits the complaint’s material allegations may be considered ex parte, as the plaintiff is already entitled to judgment on the presented facts. Furthermore, the purpose of the three-day notice rule was satisfied since Dino filed an opposition to the motion. Finally, the proper remedy from a final judgment on the pleadings is an appeal, not a special civil action for certiorari. Dino’s failure to appeal precluded her from resorting to certiorari to challenge the judgment. The petition was dismissed.