GR 43672; (January, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-43672. January 31, 1978.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. G. JESUS B. RUIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance, First Judicial District, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and RODRIGO MAMANAO y BATTUNG, respondents.
FACTS
The prosecution filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge G. Jesus B. Ruiz to give due course to its notice of appeal in a criminal case for homicide. The respondent Judge had convicted private respondent Rodrigo Mamanao of homicide but appreciated the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, imposing a penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and an indemnity of P4,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. The prosecution, dissatisfied with this penalty and indemnity, filed a notice of appeal. The respondent Judge, however, failed to act on this notice, prompting the prosecution to allege that the approval of an appeal is a purely ministerial duty.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution’s appeal from the judgment of conviction, which seeks a review of the penalty imposed, is legally permissible without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The prosecution’s appeal is expressly prohibited as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The legal logic is anchored on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states that the People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. This rule is a procedural embodiment of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The Court found the petition devoid of merit, as the controlling doctrine was firmly established in People v. Ang Cho Kio. In that case, the Court ruled that a prosecution appeal from a judgment of conviction, which seeks a higher penalty, places the accused in the danger of being punished again for the same offense after having already been sentenced. This principle has been consistently reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, such as People v. Paez and People v. Pomeroy, where motions for reconsideration of the Ang Cho Kio doctrine were explicitly rejected. The prosecution’s attempt to appeal the penalty, after the accused had already been convicted and sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction, constitutes a second jeopardy. The respondent Judge’s refusal to give due course to the notice of appeal was therefore correct and in accordance with settled law. The Court noted the prosecution’s lack of familiarity with authoritative jurisprudence and advised greater diligence to avoid such procedural blunders in the future.