G.R. No. L-43345. July 29, 1976.
JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and ONG CU, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Josefina S. de Laureano, the registered owner of two lots in Iloilo City, filed an ejectment suit against her lessee, respondent Ong Cu, after the alleged expiration of their lease. The Iloilo City Court ruled in her favor, ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, remove his improvements, and pay monthly compensation and damages. Ong Cu appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). To stay execution, he filed an ex parte motion in the city court, which approved a supersedeas bond of P22,000 and fixed the monthly rental deposit at P1,200, amounts significantly lower than those adjudged by the city court.
Upon the elevation of the records to the CFI, de Laureano filed motions for immediate execution and for a preliminary mandatory injunction. She argued that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory, and that the supersedeas bond and rental deposits were grossly inadequate, failing to comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The respondent judge denied both motions, upholding the city court’s ex parte order and reasoning that granting a mandatory injunction would be absurd after having sanctioned a bond meant to stay execution.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motions for execution and for a preliminary mandatory injunction.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the challenged orders. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and explicit provisions of Section 8, Rule 70. A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory. To stay execution, a defendant-appellant must perfect an appeal and file a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the inferior court, and must also deposit with the appellate court the rentals or reasonable value for the use and occupation as determined by the inferior court’s judgment. Here, Ong Cu failed to comply with the second requirement. The city court’s ex parte order, which drastically reduced the deposit amount from the P12,428 monthly compensation it had itself adjudged, was a patent nullity. The CFI had no discretion to uphold this invalid order. By failing to make the correct deposits, Ong Cu lost his right to stay execution.
Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in denying the motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction under Article 1674 of the Civil Code. This substantive provision grants the lessor a speedy remedy to be restored in possession if the lessee’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory. The CFI’s rationale—that it would be absurd to stay execution and simultaneously restore possession—ignored the separate and distinct nature of this remedy, which is designed precisely to cut through dilatory appeals in ejectment cases. The respondent judge’s refusal to exercise this power constituted grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court directed the issuance of the writ of execution and remanded the case for determination on the motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction.