G.R. No. L-42800. April 7, 1976.
Lim Se and Benito Lim, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Manuel A. Argel, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XXXV; Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, Francisco San Pedro, Genaro Bulotano, and The Sheriff of the City of Baguio and/or his Deputy/Deputies or Deputy Esteban S. Par, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners, Lim Se and Benito Lim, leased portions of the Venancia Building in Baguio City. Their original lease from Venancia Chiombon (through Francisco San Pedro) expired in 1970. They subsequently entered into a new lease, valid until March 31, 1977, with the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr., which claimed ownership of the building’s lot. Meanwhile, respondent Genaro Bulotano, claiming to have purchased the building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, filed a real action for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. C-3547) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, despite the property being located in Baguio. The San Pedro respondents then filed an unverified third-party complaint against the Lims, essentially an ejectment suit, within that Caloocan case.
The Lims moved to dismiss this third-party complaint on grounds of improper venue, citing a stipulation in their old lease that venue for any suit would be Baguio City. The trial court denied the motion and later granted a summary judgment ordering the Lims to vacate. The Lims then filed a petition with the Supreme Court, which issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore their possession, having been ousted by virtue of the lower court’s order.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Homobono A. Adaza, counsel for the respondents, committed direct contempt of court by employing “vicious, abusive and disrespectful language” in a motion assailing the Supreme Court’s issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

RULING

Yes, Atty. Adaza is guilty of direct contempt. In his “motion to lift the writ,” he recklessly contended the injunction had “no legal nor factual basis” and was “unjust and constitutes a serious miscarriage of justice.” The Court found this characterization unfounded and unwarranted. The legal logic proceeds from an examination of the propriety of the injunction itself. The underlying petition contained extensive, unrebutted allegations demonstrating a complex property dispute where the Lims, under a lease from the estate claiming the lot, were ousted via a summary judgment in an action filed in the wrong venue (Caloocan instead of Baguio). The Supreme Court’s power to issue ex parte mandatory injunctions in such contexts, especially to restore possession after an ejectment, is well-established, as seen in Leduna vs. Enriquez.
Therefore, Atty. Adaza’s sweeping accusations were not a valid critique but a disrespectful attack on a Court resolution, carrying derogatory implications that constitute contempt in facie curiae under Rule 71. Treating a Supreme Court resolution as an adversary’s pleading to be assailed with abrasive language undermines judicial authority. However, considering his inexperience in appellate practice, the Court opted for severe reprimand over imprisonment or a fine, with a warning for future conduct.