G.R. No. L-42184 July 29, 1977
TRANS-PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered an Order Amending Original Decision on November 27, 1974, in favor of Trans-Philippines, Inc. against Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. The private respondent received a copy on December 4, 1974, giving it until January 3, 1975, to perfect its appeal. On December 27, 1974, it filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a motion for a 15-day extension to file its record on appeal, citing “pressure of work.” The petitioner opposed this motion, arguing it was defective and that the filing of a record on appeal within the 30-day period was mandatory. The trial court initially granted the extension on February 4, 1975, and later approved the record on appeal filed on February 8, 1975. However, on May 26, 1975, the trial court dismissed the appeal, finding the record on appeal was filed late and the appeal was not perfected. Remarkably, just two days later, on May 28, 1975, the same court motu proprio reconsidered and approved the record on appeal. The Court of Appeals sustained this approval, prompting the petitioner to file the instant special civil action.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the trial court’s approval of the record on appeal and in not dismissing the appeal for having been perfected out of time.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the period for perfecting an appeal. Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, an appeal is perfected only upon the timely filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal within the 30-day reglementary period from notice of judgment. The filing of a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal does not, by itself, suspend the running of this period. Applying the doctrine established in Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals and the concurring opinion in Reyes v. Sta. Maria, the Court held that if such a motion is filed within the original period but is not acted upon until after that period lapses, the appellant assumes the risk. If the motion is ultimately denied after the original period expires, the appeal is not perfected. Conversely, if the motion is granted, the extension is tacked to the original period, but the grant must be made before the extension period itself expires. Here, the motion for extension was filed within the original period, asking for an extension until January 18, 1975. The trial court did not grant the extension until February 4, 1975, which was after the requested extension period of January 18 had already lapsed. At that point, the court had lost jurisdiction to grant the extension, as there was no showing of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect that prevented the filing. Consequently, the record on appeal filed on February 8, 1975, was indisputably late, and the appeal was never duly perfected. The trial court’s subsequent orders, including its motu proprio reconsideration, were issued in excess of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation constituted grave abuse of discretion.