GR 42088; (May, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-42088. May 7, 1976.
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
FACTS
Sotero Baluyut died, leaving a substantial estate. His nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging the widow, Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut, was mentally incapable and surmising a will existed. The lower court initially appointed Alfredo as special administrator but later cancelled this, finding the widow “healthy and mentally qualified” after a brief court examination. It then appointed Alfredo and Jose Espino (who claimed to be a natural child of the deceased) as joint special administrators. Subsequently, the widow moved for her own appointment as regular administratrix. Alfredo opposed, presenting an order from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declaring the widow an incompetent. The probate court, without receiving formal evidence and relying on a short colloquy with the widow, appointed her as regular administratrix, citing her preferential right as surviving spouse.
ISSUE
Whether the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing the widow as administratrix without a proper hearing on her competency and in light of the subsequent revelation of a will.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the appointment. The legal logic is twofold. First, the probate court’s summary appointment, based merely on a cursory examination and the assumption that Alfredo had no interest in the estate, was procedurally irregular. Alfredo had squarely raised the issue of the widow’s competency, supported by a guardianship order, and was entitled to an adequate opportunity to present evidence on her fitness. Second, and decisively, Alfredo later manifested that Sotero Baluyut had indeed executed a will. This revelation fundamentally altered the proceedings. The law mandates the probate of a will as a matter of public policy. The existence of a will necessitates converting the intestate proceeding into a testamentary one. After probate, any prior letters of administration must be revoked, and proceedings for letters testamentary or administration under the will must follow. The lower court’s order, issued without considering these imperative steps and without a proper hearing on the administratrix’s competency, constituted a departure from the orderly course of probate procedure, amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Court directed the lower court to conduct further proceedings consistent with these guidelines.
