GR 41753; (May, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41753. May 11, 1978.
JOSE V. HERRERA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUARDSON R. LOOD, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PURA KALAW LEDESMA, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS
The case originated from a petition filed by Jose V. Herrera before the Supreme Court. The specific nature of his petition against the Court of Appeals, Judge Guardson R. Lood, Pura Kalaw Ledesma, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc., is not detailed in the resolution, as the proceedings were terminated prior to a substantive ruling on the merits. The underlying dispute presumably involved civil obligations or claims among the parties.
During the pendency of the Supreme Court case, the parties reached an amicable settlement of their differences in a related civil case pending in the Court of First Instance. This settlement was formalized in Civil Case No. 20011, entitled “Pura Kalaw Ledesma vs. Jose V. Herrera.”
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should dismiss the petition in view of a compromise agreement executed by the parties in a related civil case, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The legal logic is grounded in the judicial policy of encouraging amicable settlements and the principle that courts will not adjudicate moot and academic questions. The parties, through their respective counsels, jointly filed a motion to dismiss dated April 4, 1978, stating they had amicably settled their differences. Attached to the motion was a decision dated January 18, 1978, rendered by Judge Alfredo M. Lazaro in Civil Case No. 20011, which was predicated on a “Motion for Judgment based on Compromise.”
The compromise agreement, having been approved by the trial court and rendered into a judgment, constitutes a final and binding resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties concerning the subject matter of their dispute. Since the very parties to the Supreme Court petition have voluntarily and mutually agreed to settle their conflict, the raison d’Γͺtre for the petition has ceased to exist. The Supreme Court, following established jurisprudence, recognizes that a compromise, once judicially approved, has the force of res judicata and terminates the litigation. To continue with the proceedings would be an exercise in futility, as there is no longer an actual, live controversy requiring judicial intervention. Consequently, the Court dismissed the case without pronouncement as to costs.
