G.R. No. L-41750 June 16, 1976
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. SOTTO and ONG TIAO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORPORATION, THE SOLID GUARANTY INC., LEONARDO T. DE GUZMAN, and CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Atty. Francisco R. Sotto and Ong Tiao were found guilty of contempt by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) in its resolutions dated August 29 and October 9, 1975. The contempt charge stemmed from alleged “acts of falsification” committed in the printing and filing of the record on appeal in CA- G.R. No. 57151 -R. The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing these resolutions as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, and following a suggestion made in open court for an amicable settlement, the parties filed a joint motion dated April 1, 1976. In this motion, the private respondent, Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation, represented by its authorized officers, stated that the contempt proceedings arose from a “mere misunderstanding and honest mistakes due to lack of communication between the parties.” The private respondents expressly withdrew their original omnibus motion that had initiated the contempt proceedings and jointly moved with the petitioners for the Supreme Court to set aside the challenged Court of Appeals resolutions.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court can directly grant the parties’ joint motion to set aside the Court of Appeals’ contempt resolutions, given the private respondent’s withdrawal and admission that the charge was based on misunderstanding and honest mistake.

RULING

The Supreme Court resolved to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action on the joint motion. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of contempt powers and the jurisdictional relationship between courts. Contempt is an offense against the authority and dignity of the court. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in a court, and concomitantly, the power to absolve, pardon, or recall a contempt citation primarily resides in the very court against which the contempt was allegedly committed.
In this case, the contempt finding was issued by the Court of Appeals. While the Supreme Court has supervisory authority and can correct acts of grave abuse of discretion, the parties’ joint motion did not seek a merits review. Instead, it was based on the private respondent’s concession that its filing of the contempt motion was “precipitate and rather uncalled for.” Since the motion effectively constitutes a plea for the offended court’s clemency or a recognition that no intentional contempt occurred, it is the Court of Appeals, as the tribunal directly affronted, that must evaluate this development and decide whether to recall its own resolutions. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its judgment on this discretionary act of recalling a contempt order when the contemned court itself has not been given the opportunity to act upon the parties’ reconciliation and changed stance.