GR 41522; (September, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41522 September 29, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE LEDESMA, accused-appellee.
FACTS
Accused Vicente Ledesma, a sales agent, was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 439 for failing to remit P230.00 from the sale of a radio on December 18, 1963. Subsequently, he was charged in Criminal Case No. 627 for a separate estafa involving his failure to remit two installment payments totaling P38.00 received from a sewing machine buyer in 1964. Both cases involved funds belonging to the same company, Conpinco Marketing Company.
Upon arraignment in the appealed case (Criminal Case No. 627), Ledesma filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his prior conviction in Criminal Case No. 439 barred this subsequent prosecution under the principle of a “continued crime.” The trial court granted the motion, prompting the prosecution to appeal. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court, as it presented a pure question of law.
ISSUE
Whether the conviction in the first estafa case constitutes double jeopardy, barring the prosecution for the second, separate estafa.
RULING
No. The trial court erred in dismissing the case. The defense of double jeopardy does not apply. For double jeopardy to attach, the second prosecution must be for the same offense. Here, the two estafa charges are distinct offenses. The requisites for double jeopardy are present in the first prosecution, but they do not shield the accused from prosecution for a different crime. The first offense involved the conversion of P230.00 from a radio sale on a specific date in 1963. The second involved the conversion of P38.00 from sewing machine installments on a different date in 1964. They are separate acts of conversion with independent criminal intents.
The Court rejected the theory of a “continuous crime.” A continuous crime requires a plurality of acts arising from a single criminal intent or resolution. The unity of intent is absent here. Each act of misappropriation was complete by itself, performed on different dates under different circumstances. Each conversion constituted a separate and distinct crime of estafa. The Court cited precedent, including People vs. Dichupa, holding that separate acts of misappropriation by an agent, even against the same principal, are distinct crimes if committed on different occasions. Therefore, the prior conviction is not a bar to the subsequent prosecution. The order of dismissal was set aside, and the case was remanded for trial.