G.R. No. L-4134

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCAS CANLEON, defendant-appellant.

September 7, 1908

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1907, Lucas Canleon approached Julia Rufin, her mother, and sister in a store. He addressed Julia Rufin in an insulting tone, saying, “Say, cursed woman, why did you deceive me? Have you forgotten the time when you claimed on my back and also when you rested in my arms?” Julia Rufin and her mother testified that the words were spoken in an insulting tone, loud enough for bystanders to hear. Canleon admitted to a conversation but denied using the offensive language, claiming he only reproached Julia for testifying against him in a prior municipal proceeding. The trial court found Canleon guilty of injurias graves (aggravated contumely), believing the prosecution witnesses and discrediting the defense witnesses. Canleon appealed, arguing that the complaint was insufficient and the language used was not contumelious.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the complaint for injurias graves was sufficient, specifically if it needed to allege explicit intent to dishonor, if the language itself was contumelious, and if it was heard by third persons who understood it detrimentally.
2. Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court was correct, particularly regarding its degree and the omission of subsidiary banishment.

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint was sufficient. Under Articles 456-458 of the Penal Code, the crime of contumely (except for written and publicly disseminated acts under the first paragraph of Article 458) is consummated if the offensive language is heard by the offended person, regardless of whether third parties hear it or not. Therefore, it was not necessary to allege that the contumelious language was heard by third persons or understood by them to be detrimental. The language used, addressed by a man to a woman in the manner alleged, was inherently contumelious, as it imputed “a lack of morality, the consequence of which might considerably damage the fame, credit, or interest” of the woman. A further formal allegation that the language was addressed to her “in her dishonor or discredit or to hold her up to contempt” was deemed unnecessary, as the language itself, under the circumstances alleged, could not fail to have this effect.
2. The Court found that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty in its minimum degree and in failing to include subsidiary banishment for non-payment of the fine. Finding no extenuating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty ought to have been imposed in the medium degree. The Supreme Court modified the sentence by substituting the original six months and one day of banishment with one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of banishment, and added subsidiary banishment in the event of the accused’s insolvency and failure to pay the fine, at the rate of one day’s banishment for each 12.50 pesetas of the fine unpaid. Thus modified, the judgment of conviction was affirmed.