G.R. No. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE, TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Jorge P. Tan, Jr., et al., were convicted of frustrated murder and double murder by respondent Judge Pedro Gallardo. They filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, along with a motion for the judge to inhibit himself from hearing said motion. Respondent Judge denied both the motion for inhibition and the motion for new trial in separate orders dated July 21 and 23, 1975, and subsequently ordered the petitioners’ transfer to the national penitentiary on July 25, 1975. The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari with prohibition, seeking to annul these orders and to prohibit the judge from further proceedings, alleging bias and prejudgment.
The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines as a respondent, filed a Comment acknowledging that the respondent judge’s decision and resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice. The Solicitor General interposed no objection to remanding the cases for a new decision by another judge after the presentation of additional evidence. However, the private prosecutors submitted a separate Comment objecting to the remand and justifying the challenged orders. The petitioners moved to strike out the private prosecutors’ comment, arguing they had no standing to adopt a position inconsistent with the Solicitor General’s in these proceedings.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with the latter in the present certiorari proceedings.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of or take a position inconsistent with the Solicitor General in these proceedings. The Court’s prior resolution had limited the private prosecutors’ participation “to collaborate with the Solicitor General,” which means to cooperate and assist, not to act independently or contravene the State’s representative. A criminal offense is an outrage against state sovereignty; thus, the prosecution is under the direction and control of the State through the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General’s role is that of a servant of the law, with a duty to ensure that justice is done, not merely to win a case. Allowing private prosecutors to adopt an independent, conflicting position would undermine this institutional role and the State’s interest in the impartial administration of justice.
Given the Solicitor General’s concession regarding the appearance of bias and the need for a new proceeding, and considering that the question of respondent judge’s disqualification had become moot as he was no longer in judicial service, the Court granted the petition. The cases were remanded to the trial court for a new judge to hear the motion for new trial and resolve it based on the evidence. The decision underscores the fundamental principle that a judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.