FACTS:

On the morning of January 22, 1906, the accused, THE MORO MATANUG, Sultan of Dimabarra, along with Moros Mamaku and Macabangan, all armed, departed from Calilangan for the military post of Parang, district of Cotabato, with the express intent to steal rifles from soldiers and kill them if necessary. They reached the post at dusk, waited until late night, then entered, cautiously ascending stairs of houses to find rifles. Finding none, they proceeded to a field tent occupied by five soldiers. Leaving Mamaku under a coconut tree about 70 yards away, the accused and Macabangan cut the ropes at the rear of the tent, entered, and suddenly attacked two sleeping soldiers, Harry Wickman and James W. McDonald, with their weapons before fleeing. McDonald received two wounds, one proving mortal, and died three days later on January 25. The accused (Matanug) carried a campilan and wounded Wickman, while Macabangan carried a lance and wounded McDonald.

The accused claimed he casually met his companions and only intended to buy goods in Parang. He asserted that he stayed overnight in Sitio Pangui, about 900 yards from the post, while his companions went ahead, unaware of their criminal intentions. He stated Mamaku and Macabangan returned the next morning, informing him they had killed Americans, prompting him to escape with them.

The lower court sentenced the accused to death for murder, with aggravating circumstances of deliberate premeditation and forcible entry. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court en consulta.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the accused’s alibi that he remained in Sitio Pangui and did not participate in the aggression was credible.
2. Whether the accused was jointly liable for the death of James W. McDonald, despite not personally inflicting the fatal wound.
3. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, deliberate premeditation, and forcible entry were correctly applied.

RULING:

The Supreme Court, in its decision dated September 3, 1908, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, sentencing THE MORO MATANUG, Sultan of Dimabarra to death.

1. Alibi disproven: The Court found conclusive evidence refuting the accused’s alibi. Witness Walker, one of the soldiers in the tent, testified seeing “three native Moros running toward the place where the new hospital is located” immediately after the aggression. Furthermore, the place where Mamaku was left was 70 yards from the tent, not 800-900 yards as implied by the accused’s alibi. This confirmed the accused’s presence at the scene and his direct participation in the attack.

2. Joint Liability: The Court ruled that the liability of the accused for McDonald’s death was the same as if he had personally caused it. The acts of the accused and Macabangan were “concerted and directed toward the carrying out of the same purpose, previously resolved and agreed upon by them, either to steal rifles from the soldiers or kill them.” This “unity of purpose and of action” made them jointly liable for all consequences of their aggression, including the death of McDonald.

3. Aggravating Circumstances:
Treachery (Alevosía): The attack was committed suddenly and unexpectedly while the victims were asleep, rendering them unable to defend themselves or offer resistance. This ensured the aggressors’ safety and qualified the crime as murder.
Deliberate Premeditation (Premeditación conocida): This was clearly demonstrated by the prior agreement to commit the crime, the long journey undertaken for this exclusive purpose, and the careful precautions taken (hiding, waiting for “taps,” searching houses) to ensure the success and safety of their criminal intent.
* Forcible Entry (Escalamiento): The lower court correctly considered this circumstance, as the accused and his companions gained entry into the military post and the tent by cutting ropes and defeating the sentry’s vigilance.

Given the presence of multiple aggravating circumstances and the absence of any mitigating circumstances, the penalty was correctly imposed in its maximum degree, which is death under Article 403 of the Penal Code.