G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992
CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Celestino Tatel, a businessman, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes against the Municipal Council of Virac and its officials. He sought to enjoin them from enforcing Municipal Resolution No. 29, which declared his warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena a public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code and directed him to remove and transfer it within two months. The resolution was based on complaints from residents about disturbances (smoke, obnoxious odor, dust) caused by the operation of an abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse, which affected the neighborhood’s peace. An investigating committee noted the crowded neighborhood with narrow roads and surrounding houses, concluding that the continued activity and storage of inflammable materials in the warehouse created a danger to lives and properties from accidental fire. Respondents contended the warehouse was constructed in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, which prohibited constructing warehouses for storing inflammable materials within 200 meters of a block of houses. Petitioner argued the ordinance was unconstitutional, contrary to due process and equal protection, and void for not being passed in accordance with law. The trial court ruled that the warehouse was legally constructed under a valid permit but that Ordinance No. 13 was a valid exercise of police power, not unconstitutional. It found that storing abaca and copra in the warehouse violated the ordinance, posed a grave danger, and constituted a public nuisance, directing petitioner to remove such inflammable articles within two months and enjoining him from storing them henceforth.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power and therefore constitutional; (2) Whether the trial court erred in interpreting the ordinance as prohibiting the storage of inflammable materials rather than just the construction of warehouses; and (3) Whether the ordinance is discriminatory because other similarly situated warehouses were not prosecuted.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that Ordinance No. 13 was a valid exercise of police power by the municipal corporation, enacted under the general welfare clause to promote health, safety, and property protection. The ordinance met the criteria for validity: it did not contravene the Constitution or any statute, was not unfair, oppressive, partial, discriminatory, or unreasonable, and did not prohibit but regulated trade. Regarding interpretation, the Court agreed with the trial court that the ordinance, despite grammatical errors, clearly prohibited the construction or maintenance of warehouses for storing inflammable articles within 200 meters of a block of houses to avoid fire hazards, not merely construction per se. The trial court did not give it a meaning different from its intent. On the claim of discrimination, the Court distinguished between the law and its enforcement, stating that the mere non-prosecution of other alleged violators, without proof they were operating in violation and that complaints were ignored, did not render the ordinance discriminatory. The Court also found no merit in the jurisdictional challenge, as the case was a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Costs were imposed against the petitioner.