G.R. No. 39720 ; April 4, 1934
In re Intestate of the deceased Mauricia de Guzman. PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. TRINIDAD MACTAL, administratrix-appellee.

FACTS

The case involves the intestate estate of Mauricia de Guzman. The appellee, Trinidad Mactal, was the administratrix. To pay estate debts approved by the court, she obtained a license to sell a parcel of land belonging to the estate. After the authorized selling price was reduced, she sold the land to Silverio Choco for P4,000 in 1926. The proceeds were used to pay the approved claims and expenses. Over two years later, in 1928, Choco resold the land to the spouses Pio Villar and Trinidad Mactal (the administratrix herself) for P4,500. The appellants, who are minor heirs of the decedent, sought to annul both sales. They alleged the sales were fictitious and collusive, and that the initial sale violated the Code of Civil Procedure as it lacked the written consent of the heirs or their guardian.

ISSUE

1. Whether the sales to Silverio Choco and subsequently to Trinidad Mactal were fictitious, collusive, and void under Article 1459 of the Civil Code, which prohibits agents and executors/administrators from purchasing property under their care.
2. Whether the court order authorizing the administratrix to sell the real estate was null and void for lack of the written consent of the heirs as required under the then-existing Section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

RULING

1. No, the sales were not void under Article 1459. The Court found no evidence of an express or implied agreement that Silverio Choco purchased the property as a mere intermediary for the benefit of administratrix Trinidad Mactal. The payments of estate debts from the P4,000 purchase price proved the sale to Choco was real and not fictitious. The subsequent resale to Mactal years later, for a higher price, did not by itself establish collusion to circumvent the legal prohibition.
2. No, the authorization was not void. While the original Section 714 required the written consent of heirs, this provision was amended by Act No. 3882 in 1931, which replaced the consent requirement with a notice requirement. This amendatory law was expressly applicable to pending proceedings. Since the intestate proceeding was still pending at the time of the amendment, the new law governed. The record showed the heirs (through their mother/guardian) were given notice of the motion to sell, complying with the amended procedure. Therefore, the court’s order authorizing the sale was valid.

The order of the lower court denying the motion to annul the sales was affirmed.

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