G.R. No. L-38587 October 28, 1977
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, CLERK OF COURT, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN (DAGUPAN CITY BRANCH) IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF EX-OFFICIO, SOCORRO ROY, MANUEL R. MAGNO, GODOFREDO R. MAGNO, ROSALIA M. SALCEDO, REBECCA M. REYES, AURORA M. PANAGUITON, and JOSE S. UBALDO, respondents.

FACTS

The Province of Pangasinan filed a complaint for expropriation on July 10, 1963, to acquire a portion of a lot owned by private respondents for use as a school site. The court authorized immediate possession upon deposit of a provisional value. Private respondents withdrew this deposit in 1966. On December 9, 1971, the trial court issued a final order fixing just compensation at P18,137.68 with legal interest from the date of taking. No appeal was perfected by the Province.
Almost two years later, on September 14, 1973, private respondents moved for execution of the final 1971 order. The Province opposed, but the court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on October 25, 1973. The Province then filed this certiorari petition, arguing the execution order was a patent nullity because the 1971 order allegedly did not constitute a final judgment as it failed to describe the property and public use with sufficient definiteness as required by the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s order of execution is a patent nullity due to an alleged failure of the 1971 judgment to meet the formal requirements for a final judgment in expropriation proceedings.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the constitutional guarantee of just compensation and the finality of judgments. The Court found the Province’s claim of nullity to be a hyperbolical misreading of Section 13, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The provision requires the judgment to state “definitely” the property condemned and the public use. The 1971 order, read in conjunction with the original complaint which was incorporated by reference, adequately described the property (a portion of a titled lot in Barrio San Julian, Malasiqui) and the public purpose (a school site). Any minor irregularity in form did not rise to the level of a “patent nullity” that could invalidate a long-final judgment.
More fundamentally, the Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty but is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, a right protected under the Due Process Clause. The Province had possessed and used the property since 1963. To countenance further delay in payment—over fourteen years after taking—through a dilatory petition would be unconscionable and a denial of the landowners’ constitutional right. The 1971 order had long become final and executory, and the trial court correctly issued the writ of execution to enforce the landowners’ vested right to just compensation. The petition was merely a tactic to unjustly delay an obligation the Province had long been constitutionally and morally bound to fulfill.