GR 38367; (November, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38367 November 24, 1978
FLORA CORSINO, MONICO NICOLAS, MANUEL AGUSTIN, JOVENCIO AGRAAN, AMANTE PALMONES and JULIO HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ANDRES NICOLAS and HON. ARNOLD A. SAVELLA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Fourth Branch, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Andres Nicolas filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against petitioners, alleging he was the sole heir of his deceased brother, Alfredo Nicolas, and that petitioners had usurped the subject land. Summonses were served on July 31, 1973. The returns indicated that petitioner Flora Corsino could not be located at her given address, while the summons for Monico Nicolas was erroneously served upon the plaintiff, Andres Nicolas himself. Despite this defective service, both Flora Corsino and Monico Nicolas, along with other defendants, voluntarily appeared by filing an ex-parte motion for extension to file an answer on August 16, 1973. Before this motion was resolved, they filed their Answer on August 20, 1973, asserting that Alfredo Nicolas was survived by his spouse Flora and son Monico, thereby contesting Andres’s claim as sole heir.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default and striking out their Answer.
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is clear on two fundamental points: jurisdiction over the person and the proper exercise of judicial discretion. First, regarding petitioners Flora Corsino and Monico Nicolas, the record conclusively showed they were not validly served with summons. Service upon Flora failed as she could not be located, and service for Monico was fatally defective as it was served on the plaintiff. However, their voluntary filing of a motion for extension constituted a voluntary appearance, which under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court is equivalent to service of summons. This voluntary act vested the court with jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, the period for them to file an Answer should be reckoned from August 16, 1973, making their Answer filed on August 20, 1973, well within the reglementary period. Declaring them in default was therefore a patent error.
Second, the Court emphasized that rules of procedure are tools to secure justice, not to defeat it. Default judgments are frowned upon, and courts must exercise sound discretion with great circumspection. The respondent judge’s haste in declaring default, despite the defendants’ clear intent to participate as shown by their timely motions and Answer, violated the directive for a liberal construction of the rules to ensure a just and inexpensive determination of proceedings. The judge failed to maturely consider the attendant circumstances, particularly the defective service and subsequent voluntary appearance, which warranted a setting aside of any default declaration to allow a fair trial on the merits. The orders and decision based on the erroneous default were annulled.