G.R. No. L-37471 January 28, 1980
Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, as Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, The Chief of Police, Anda, Bohol and Candelaria Arana, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan was convicted of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol. On appeal, the case was raffled to the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, presided by Judge Paulino Marquez. Judge Marquez prepared and signed a decision dated June 22, 1973, convicting the petitioner. Notice for its promulgation on July 6, 1973, was served on June 26, 1973. However, Judge Marquez retired from service due to age on June 27, 1973.
The promulgation was postponed to July 12, and finally to July 16, 1973. On that date, respondent Executive Judge Fernando S. Ruiz promulgated the decision prepared by the retired Judge Marquez. Consequently, the petitioner was confined in the provincial jail. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending the promulgation was void as it was made after the rendering judge’s retirement.

ISSUE

Whether a decision can be validly promulgated by another judge after the judge who penned it has retired from the judiciary.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring the promulgation null and void. The legal logic is firmly rooted in a well-settled doctrine: a judge who has retired or otherwise left the bench ceases to have any judicial authority. Consequently, any decision written by that judge cannot be validly promulgated after their separation from office. Promulgation is the judicial act by which the decision is made known to the parties, and it is an integral part of the adjudicative process that requires the judge to be clothed with judicial authority at the time it is done.
The Court cited controlling precedents, including Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, People v. Court of Appeals, and Jimenez v. Republic. In Jimenez, it was explicitly held that a decision rendered by a retired judge is null and void and cannot acquire binding effect upon promulgation after retirement. The act of promulgation by another judge does not cure this fatal defect, as the decision itself is considered a nullity from its inception due to the judge’s lack of authority at the purported time of promulgation. The Court found no justification for respondent Judge Ruiz’s action in disregarding this clear juristic norm. While the habeas corpus aspect was rendered moot by the petitioner’s subsequent release after serving his sentence, the Court issued this opinion to reaffirm the doctrine and remove any doubt regarding its continued application. The petition was ultimately dismissed for being moot and academic.