GR 37165; (May, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 37165 & G.R. No. 37166 , May 15, 1989
Primitivo Nepomuceno and Emerenciana Nepomuceno, petitioners, vs. Benjamin Salazar, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Primitivo and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed separate complaints for ejectment against their agricultural tenant, respondent Benjamin Salazar, before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). They sought to recover their landholdings in Bulacan on two grounds: first, for personal cultivation, and second, for conversion of the land to commercial or non-agricultural uses, specifically for poultry and hog farming projects. The complaints were filed on July 14, 1970.
During the pendency of the trial, Republic Act No. 6389 took effect on September 10, 1971, amending the Agricultural Land Reform Code. This amendment deleted the landowner’s personal cultivation as a permissible ground for ejecting a tenant. Respondent Salazar filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that this new law, being remedial and beneficial to tenants, should be applied retroactively to the pending cases. The CAR, in an Order dated January 15, 1972, partially granted the motion, dismissing the cause of action for personal cultivation but allowing the case to proceed on the ground of conversion.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the CAR Order of January 15, 1972, which dismissed one cause of action but allowed another to proceed, is a final and appealable order or merely an interlocutory one. A secondary issue, upon resolving the first, is whether Republic Act No. 6389 , which removed personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment, should be given retroactive effect to cases filed before its enactment.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the CAR Order was a final order on the specific issue of personal cultivation, not a mere interlocutory one. An interlocutory order does not dispose of the case but leaves something to be done by the court. In contrast, a final order terminates a distinct part of the litigation. Here, the order definitively dismissed the personal cultivation ground, completely removing it from the case’s future consideration. This constituted an adjudication on the merits of that particular substantive right, making the order final and appealable for that segment of the case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal as having been taken from an interlocutory order.
On the substantive issue of retroactivity, the Court held that Republic Act No. 6389 could not be applied retroactively. Laws are generally prospective unless the statute expressly provides for retroactive application or there is a clear implication to that effect. The Court cited its ruling in Calderon v. Dela Cruz, which held that applying the new law to deprive landowners of a right they had already asserted in court before the law’s passage would be unjust. The legislative intent in originally allowing personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment was to encourage small landowners to cultivate their own land. Applying the amendment retroactively would thwart this policy and impair vested rights. Thus, both grounds for ejectment—personal cultivation and conversion—remained available to the petitioners at the time they filed their complaints. The Supreme Court set aside the resolutions of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings.
