G.R. Nos. L-36042 & L-36191 July 15, 1980
GERARDO SARMIENTO Y CAHIWAT, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents; ANTONIO G. MASCARDO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Gerardo Sarmiento and Antonio Mascardo, along with others, were charged with illegal possession of firearms. The prosecution evidence established that on the night of August 1, 1962, Policeman Felipe Valderrama responded to a reported disturbance in Caloocan City. He stopped a jeepney carrying the accused, identified himself, and ordered them to alight. A search of the vehicle yielded a submachine gun near the driver’s seat, an icepick, a knife, and an iron bar. During investigation at the police station, co-accused Romulo Cerdenola admitted ownership of the firearm, and a PC officer confirmed it was functional and of a caliber not subject to ordinary license.
The petitioners and Cerdenola appealed their conviction from the City Court to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. Sarmiento and Mascardo then filed separate petitions for review with the Supreme Court. They denied conspiracy, each proffering independent and allegedly innocent reasons for being in the jeepney that night—Sarmiento claimed he was buying medicine, Mascardo that he was invited for coffee, and Cerdenola that he was buying cigarettes.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether conspiracy existed among the accused, thereby making all of them liable for the illegal possession of the single firearm found in the vehicle they jointly occupied.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding conspiracy convincingly established. The Court rejected the individual alibis as improbable and contrived. It noted that an invitation for coffee at 10:30 PM, waiting for a jeepney to travel a mere 40-50 meters, and boarding a jeepney without knowing its destination to buy medicine just two blocks away were stories that “inspire credence” and were “quite hard to believe.” The community of evil intent and concerted action to retaliate against their adversaries, as inferred from the circumstances, sufficed to establish conspiracy.
With conspiracy proven, the legal logic applied is that possession of the unlicensed firearm is ascribed to all conspirators. The Court held it was unnecessary to pinpoint who had physical possession (animus possidendi). All petitioners were deemed in constructive, if not actual, possession of the weapon, which they brought along to serve their common criminal purpose. This constructive possession, even if temporary, completes the elements of the crime. The appealed judgment was affirmed in toto.