GR 35356; (May, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-35356 May 18, 1973
ONG CHING, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU, JOSE JAYME, ROSARIO J. SOCO, ADRIANO SOCO, CARMEN J. PEREZ, FULGENCIO M. PEREZ, TRINIDAD J. LUMAPAS, LUPECINC LUMAPAS, CORAZON J. TRUZ, MATILDE J. YBAÑEZ, and DOMINGO YBAÑEZ, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ong Ching, as lessee, filed a complaint against the private respondents, the owners, for damages and injunction. He sought damages for their refusal to renew the lease for another fifteen years and an injunction to prevent the sale of the property without annotating the lease agreement on the title. The trial court dismissed his complaint. It ordered him to vacate the premises, remove his improvements, pay accrued rentals, and pay attorney’s fees. After receiving the judgment, a motion for reconsideration was filed not by his counsel of record, Atty. Candido Vasquez, but by Atty. Higinio Hermosisima. Private respondents opposed, arguing the motion was filed by a new counsel without a proper substitution, thus it did not suspend the period to appeal. The trial court denied the motion, ruled it had no legal effect, deemed the judgment final, and granted a writ of execution. The sheriff levied on petitioner’s properties, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
The main issues are: (1) whether the filing of the motion for reconsideration suspended the period to appeal, and (2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order petitioner to vacate the premises.
RULING
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled the motion for reconsideration validly suspended the appeal period. The settled rule for a valid substitution of attorneys requires a written application, client’s consent, and the substituted attorney’s consent. This case, however, did not involve a substitution but the employment of an additional collaborating counsel. In law, an attorney appearing in court is presumed to have sufficient authority. The fact a second attorney appears does not presume the first attorney’s authority is withdrawn; a party may have multiple collaborating lawyers. Here, Atty. Vasquez subsequently executed a certificate, with petitioner’s written conformity, authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate due to Vasquez’s ill health. While this certificate was filed belatedly, respondents did not disprove its truth. Therefore, the motion was filed by a duly authorized counsel and effectively tolled the running of the period for appeal. The trial court’s order granting execution was issued prematurely.
On the second issue, the Court held the trial court had jurisdiction. Petitioner’s action for damages and injunction essentially involved the enforcement of the renewal clause in the lease. The respondents’ counterclaim for ejectment, seeking to recover possession, was a necessary and compulsory counterclaim arising out of the same transaction—the lease agreement and its alleged termination. Since the court validly acquired jurisdiction over the main action, it also acquired jurisdiction over the compulsory counterclaim. The court was empowered to grant complete relief and resolve all issues stemming from the lease controversy, including the right to possession. The petition was dismissed.
