G.R. No. L-35027, September 10, 1973
HONORABLE CESAR VIRATA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance, Pasig, Rizal, JUANITO P. TINSAY, and GREGORIO C. GUIDO, etc., respondents.

FACTS

The case involves a dispute over imported goods consigned to “Los Hijos del Dios Vivo y Omnipotente” (Hijos). Private respondent Juanito P. Tinsay, claiming to be the purchaser of these goods from Hijos, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. To secure his claim against possible fraud, Tinsay sought and obtained from respondent Judge a writ of preliminary attachment over the goods, which were still in the custody of the Bureau of Customs. The customs officials, petitioners herein, challenged the court’s jurisdiction to issue the attachment writ, arguing it interfered with the exclusive administrative authority of the Bureau of Customs over imported articles prior to the payment of duties and taxes.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether a court of first instance has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment over imported goods still under the custody and control of the Bureau of Customs, prior to the payment of customs duties and taxes.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through the main opinion, ruled in favor of the petitioners and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the writ of attachment. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of exclusive customs jurisdiction. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, the Bureau of Customs exercises exclusive authority over imported goods from the moment of their arrival until the legal duties and taxes are paid. This jurisdiction is administrative and quasi-judicial in nature. The court emphasized that while the goods remain in customs custody, they are considered in custodia legis for the purpose of enforcing customs laws, and are not subject to the control of the regular courts through provisional remedies like attachment. To allow such an attachment would constitute an unlawful interference by the judiciary in the executive function of revenue collection. The Court clarified that only after the goods are released from customs custody, upon full payment of dues, do they become property subject to ordinary legal processes. The dissenting opinions of Justices Barredo and Teehankee, however, viewed the order not as a traditional attachment seizing property, but as a permissible garnishment notice that would only take effect after duties were paid, thus not interfering with the customs process. The main opinion rejected this, holding that any court order affecting the goods while under customs control is a violation of the statutory exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.