G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977
ROSALINA TONGSON, applicant-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants, MACARIO BERMEJO, ETC., oppositor.

FACTS

Rosalina Tongson applied for registration of title over Lot 855 of the Pilar cadastral survey. The Director of Forestry opposed, claiming the lot was part of the inalienable timberland or public forest. Oppositor Macario Bermejo, as judicial administrator of the estate of Santiago M. Bermejo, also opposed, asserting ownership through acquisitive prescription. The trial court dismissed Tongson’s application and upheld Bermejo’s claim, finding the land was not forestal but disposable agricultural land. The Director of Forestry appealed, arguing the land, originally mangrove swamps, remained part of the public forest domain under the Administrative Code of 1917 and was thus not subject to private appropriation.
The trial court’s factual findings established a chain of possession since 1905. Francisco Borja possessed the land, cut trees for firewood, and operated a salt factory. Upon his death, his son Arturo Borja continued possession until 1910. Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao in 1917, who later sold it to Santiago M. Bermejo in 1940. The Bermejo estate possessed the land openly, continuously, and adversely. By 1953, Macario Bermejo converted it into a fishpond, later leasing it out. The court found possession by Bermejo and his predecessors-in-interest to be peaceful, open, continuous, adverse, and in the concept of owner for over fifty years.

ISSUE

Whether a parcel of land, originally mangrove swamps but converted into a fishpond and possessed privately since 1905, forms part of the inalienable public forest or is disposable agricultural land subject to registration.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling the land was alienable and registrable in favor of oppositor Macario Bermejo. The legal logic proceeds from two key points. First, the Court deferred to the trial court’s factual findings, which are conclusive absent a showing of grave error. The court found the land was not forestal in character, as the mangrove trees were small, sparse, and fit only for firewood, not of commercial lumber value. Such land does not form part of the public forest domain.
Second, on the legal argument, the Court held that even assuming the land was originally mangrove swamps, it was not automatically classified as inalienable public forest. Citing established jurisprudence, notably Jocson v. Director of Forestry (1919) and Garchitorena Vda. de Contrera v. Obias (1933), the Court ruled that mangrove lands are not forest lands under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (the Philippine Bill of 1902), which governed public land classification at the inception of the possession in 1905. The Act classified public lands only as timber, mineral, or agricultural; lands not timber or mineral were necessarily agricultural. The subsequent inclusion of mangrove swamps in the definition of “public forest” under the Administrative Code of 1917 could not impair vested rights that had accrued prior to its enactment. Since the possession and claims of ownership commenced in 1905, the applicable law was the 1902 Act, under which the land was agricultural. Therefore, the long, continuous, and adverse possession perfected a title by prescription. The appeal by the Director of Forestry lacked merit.