GR 34164 79; (October, 1971) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-34164-79 October 25, 1971
FLORENCIO BERNABE, petitioner, vs. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal (Br. VIII) and ROMERO A. R. AMBROCIO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Florencio Bernabe, a mayoralty candidate, sought to dismiss several exclusion cases filed by respondent Election Registrar Romero A. R. Ambrocio against certain registered voters in Parañaque, Rizal. The petitions for exclusion were filed with the Court of First Instance on September 24, 1971. Bernabe contended that these cases were filed beyond the statutory deadline of September 9, 1971, as fixed by Section 137 of the new Election Code of 1971 ( Republic Act No. 6388 ), which prohibits the filing of such petitions within sixty days before a regular election. The respondent court denied Bernabe’s motions to dismiss.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), invoking the transitory authority granted under Section 240 of the same Election Code, had promulgated Resolution No. RR-938 on September 3, 1971. This resolution extended the deadline for filing exclusion cases to October 14, 1971, for the November 8, 1971 elections. The COMELEC justified the extension by stating that it was no longer reasonably possible to observe the periods prescribed in the newly enacted code and that such action was necessary to prevent the deprivation of the right of suffrage and to allow for the proper adjudication of rights.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC validly exercised its authority under Section 240 of the Election Code of 1971 in extending the deadline for filing exclusion cases to October 14, 1971, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the respondent court to hear the petitions filed on September 24, 1971.
RULING
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the COMELEC’s resolution and dismissed the petition. The legal logic rests on the explicit grant of transitory power to the COMELEC under Section 240 of the Election Code of 1971. This provision authorizes the Commission to fix other periods for pre-election acts if, upon the Code’s approval, it is no longer reasonably possible to observe the prescribed periods, with the directive that voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage.
The Court found that the condition for exercising this authority was satisfied. The new Code took effect on September 2, 1971, making the original September 9 deadline impracticable. Furthermore, the COMELEC had concurrently extended the voter registration period to September 10, 1971. Applying the new Code’s deadline strictly would have created an absurdity: the period to challenge ineligible voters would have expired on September 9, even before the extended registration period ended. This would have effectively shielded illegally registered voters from exclusion. The extension to October 14 was thus a reasonable and necessary measure to harmonize the registration and exclusion processes, ensuring the integrity of the voter list. The Court clarified that the prohibition against implied powers in Section 247 of the Code was inapplicable, as the power exercised was expressly granted by the transitory provision. The temporary restraining order was lifted, and the respondent court was directed to resolve the exclusion cases promptly.
