G.R. No. L-34156 and L-34158 October 29, 1971
ALEJANDRO C. SIAZON, Senior State Prosecutor, petitioner, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT, 16th Judicial District Davao City, JOSE ESCRIBANO, RENAN PADILLA, TIMOTEO SUPEN alias “TIMOT” alias “EMOT” and ALFREDO SUPEN alias “PEDONG,” respondents.

FACTS

The respondents, Jose Escribano and Renan Padilla, were accused of murder in three cases before the Circuit Criminal Court of Davao City. They filed petitions for bail. Initially, the court ordered a joint hearing on the merits of the cases and the bail applications. After the prosecution presented 27 witnesses over three months, the court, upon the defense’s motion, reconsidered and decided to hear the bail applications separately first. The prosecution announced it intended to present approximately 13 more corroborative witnesses before calling its principal witness, Angelico Najar, a discharged co-accused turned state witness. The defense filed an urgent motion to compel the prosecution to either close its evidence or present Najar immediately. The respondent judge granted the motion, ordering the prosecution to present Najar on the next scheduled hearing dates; failure to do so would result in the court closing the prosecution’s evidence for the bail hearing and allowing the defense to present its evidence.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order limiting the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and compelling it to present its principal witness ahead of other corroborative witnesses in the bail hearing.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that while a bail hearing is summary in nature, the prosecution must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong. The prosecution has the prerogative to determine the order of presenting its witnesses, and a court cannot compel it to present a specific witness at a particular time. The respondent judge’s order effectively curtailed this prosecutorial discretion and risked depriving the prosecution of due process. The Court clarified that the constitutional right to bail does not justify a court arbitrarily limiting the number of witnesses or dictating the sequence of their presentation, especially when the prosecution has not been dilatory. The proper course was for the court to allow the prosecution to present its evidence in a logical order, subject to reasonable control to prevent unnecessary delay. The order was annulled and set aside. The case was remanded with instructions for the respondent court to proceed with the bail hearing, allowing the prosecution to present Najar without prejudice to the court’s discretion to permit other witnesses as deemed necessary for justice.