GR 33818; (September, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33818. September 26, 1973.
LECAR & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Lecar & Sons, Inc. (Lecar) protested the validity of Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation’s (Infanta) fifty lode mining claims before the Director of Mines. Lecar argued the claims were void because their declarations of location were fatally defective. Specifically, Lecar alleged that all fifty claims referenced an identical bearing and distance to the same tie-point (BBM 26 Linao-Ipilan), resulting in overlapping, non-contiguous claims. Lecar further contended this tie-point was a “non-existent and useless monument” as its rectangular coordinates were not provided, violating the Mining Act. Lecar also asserted the area contained no mineral veins, making it suitable only for placer claims, which Lecar held.
The Director of Mines dismissed Lecar’s protest without requiring Infanta to present evidence, finding Lecar failed to substantiate its allegations. On appeal, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the dismissal. Lecar then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision. This motion was denied by an officer acting as the Undersecretary for Natural Resources, who was the very same Director of Mines whose original dismissal order was under review.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should give due course to Lecar’s petition for review, considering the alleged grave procedural and substantive errors in the administrative proceedings.
RULING
The Supreme Court, in a Resolution, denied Lecar’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed its prior denial of the petition for review. The Court’s majority, through memoranda prepared by Justice Castro, found no merit in granting the petition. The core legal logic rested on the application of Presidential Decree No. 99-A, which provided that a mining claim registered in accordance with law, even if defective in form or technicality, grants the registrant the exclusive right to the claim. The administrative tribunals found Infanta’s claims were first registered, and Lecar failed to present convincing evidence that the declarations of location were null and void beyond mere technical defects. The alleged flaws—the overlapping plotting and the tie-point issue—were deemed technical in nature and not sufficient to invalidate the prior registration under the decree.
Regarding procedural due process, the Court found that the Director of Mines acted within his authority to dismiss the protest based on Lecar’s failure of proof during its presentation. The fact that the same Director later, in a different capacity, denied Lecar’s motion for reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision, while noted, was not deemed a sufficient denial of due process to warrant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, especially in light of the substantive application of P.D. 99-A. The Court concluded no useful purpose would be served by giving due course to the petition. Justice Teehankee dissented, voting to grant reconsideration, emphasizing the important first-impression questions on mining law and the anomalous procedural situation where a reviewing officer upheld his own prior decision.
