G.R. No. L-33156 and G.R. No. L-34011, July 25, 1973
Generoso A. Buendia, et al. vs. The City of Baguio, et al. / Napoleon D. Villanueva vs. Hon. Secretary of Justice, et al.

FACTS

Republic Act No. 5967 , enacted on June 21, 1969, provided for salary increases for city judges. Section 7 of the Act fixed specific annual salaries, such as P19,000 for first-class cities like Baguio. However, a proviso in the same section stated that “the salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the city mayor.” The city mayors of Baguio and Butuan received P18,000 per annum. Acting on resolutions from their respective city councils, petitioners-city judges were initially paid P19,000 annually.
Respondent Secretary of Justice issued an opinion, adopted by respondent Auditor General in a Provisional Memorandum, ruling that the qualifying proviso controlled, limiting the judges’ salaries to P16,800 per annum (P100/month less than the mayor’s P18,000). Consequently, the city treasurers demanded refunds for the alleged overpayments. Petitioners then filed these actions, essentially appealing the Auditor General’s adverse decision and seeking to prohibit its enforcement and to compel payment at the higher rate.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to directly review the decision of the Auditor General regarding the salary claims of petitioners-city judges.

RULING

No, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. The petitions are dismissed. The Court held that the fundamental and prejudicial question was jurisdictional. At the time the petitions were filed (March and September 1971), the governing law was the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 327 . Under these laws, only a “private party or entity” could appeal an adverse decision of the Auditor General directly to the Supreme Court. For all other parties, including government officials and employees, the proper remedy was an appeal to the President, whose action would be final.
Applying its recent precedent in PEMA vs. Auditor General, the Court ruled that petitioners, as city judges, are public officers and not private persons or entities. Therefore, their appeal from the Auditor General’s decision on their salary claims—which are essentially money claims against the government—should have been taken to the President, not to the Supreme Court. Since no constitutional issue was raised against Republic Act No. 5967 , and the acts complained of fell within the Auditor General’s competence, the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus were also not available. The Court thus declined to rule on the substantive interpretation of the salary provisions in Republic Act No. 5967 , having no jurisdiction over the appeal.